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Killing Egyptian Prisoners of War:
Does the Phrase "Lest We Forget"
Apply to Israeli War Criminals?
Scott R. Morris*
ABSTRACT

This Article offers an analysis of Israel's response, or
lack thereof, to the 1995 admission by Israeli war hero
General Ayre Biro that he participated In the slaughter of
forty-nine unarmed Egyptianprisonersof war in 1956 during
Israel's strugglefor independence. While in the past Israel
has actively pursued the prosecution of war criminals who
committed atrocities against its own people under the battle
cry "lest we forget," the country has recently shown a strong
reluctance to take action against General Biro for his
execution of Egyptian prisoners of war. Specifically, Israel
reasons that its statute of limitationsfor murder precludes the
prosecution of General Biro in Israel. In this Article, the
author argues that General Biro's actions as well as Israel's
protective stance toward General Biro constitute violations of
International law. Therefore, he asserts, Israel has three
legal options: (1) turn over General Biro (voluntarily or
through an extraditionrequest)to a mutually agreeable nation

*Major, U.S. Army; Professor, International and Operational Law Department,
The Judge Advocate General's School of the Army; B.S. 1982 (Indiana University
of Pennsylvania), J.D. 1985 (Temple University), M.B.A. 1986 (Temple University),
LL.M. 1995 (The Judge Advocate General's School of the Army). The opinions and
conclusions reflected in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or any governmental agency.
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for trial; (2) try him by a military commission (if recognized by
Israeli law); or (3) hand General Biro over to an international
tribunal. Upon evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
these options, the author concludes that Israel should refer
this case to the United Nations for investigation by an
independent prosecutor. This recommended plan of action,
he argues, both allows Israel to meet its obligations under
internationallaw and prevents Egyptfrom acquiringpersonal
jurisdictionover GeneralBiro.
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"For a commander to disembarrass his army of the presence and
charge of prisoners of war by taking their lives would be a barbarity
I
which would be denounced by all civilized nations."

I. INTRODUCTION

In early August 1995, Israeli journalists from the weekly
magazine Yerushalayim approached retired Israeli General Arye
Biro and asked him to discuss his experiences during Israel's
struggle for independence.
The reporters approached General
Biro because he was an Auschwitz survivor and was one of only a
handful of surviving warriors who had fought in every Israeli
war. 2 During this interview, these reporters asked him whether
a recent historian's report that he had executed Egyptian
prisoners of war during the 1956 war was true. 3 To the reporters'
shock and amazement, General Biro then bluntly recounted
graphic details of the slaughter of forty-nine unarmed Egyptians
his unit had captured in October, 1956.
This Article begins in Part II with a review of the facts
surrounding the recent disclosure by General Arye Biro regarding
the killing of the Egyptian prisoners of war in 1956. Part III looks
at whether the captured Egyptians were entitled to any protected
status under international law. Parts IV thru VII evaluate Israel's
response to this incident and its legal obligations under
international law. Part VIII provides an overview of Egypt's legal
options for judicial action against General Biro, absent Israel's
compliance with its international law obligations. Finally, this
Article concludes that Israel should refer this matter to the United
Nations for investigation by an independent prosecutor.

1.
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 791 (2d ed. 1920).
2.
See Barton Gellman, Debate Tainting Image of Purity Wrenches Israelis;
A More Open Society Takes Up Killing of POWs During Wars, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
1995, at Al [hereinafter Gellman].
3.
Id. For a full account of the events surrounding and occurring during
the crisis, see S.L.A. MARSHALL, SINAI VICTORY: COMMAND DECISIONS IN HISTORY'S
SHORTEST WAR, IsRAEL'S HUNDRED-HOUR CONQUEST OF EGYPT EAST OF SUEZ, AUTUMN,
1956 (1958); ROBERT HENRIQUES, ONE HUNDRED HOURS TO SUEZ: AN ACCOUNT OF
ISRAEL'S CAMPAIGN IN THE SINAI PENINSULA (1957).
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II. FACTS: THE KILLING OF EGYPTIAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND ISRAELI
AND EGYPTIAN RESPONSES

A. The Killing of Forty-Nine EgyptianPOWs
On August 4, 1995, the newspaper Ma'ariv printed the
interview with General Biro.4 In the interview, General Biro
recounted that, as a young company commander, his unit
parachuted more than 100 miles behind enemy lines into the
Mitla Pass in October, 1956.5 The Mitla Pass was one of two main
supply routes leading from "central Sinai to the Suez canal."6 His
unit captured dozens of "scared, broken, exhausted" Egyptian
prisoners. 7
General Biro recalled, "We were hundreds of
kilometres behind enemy lines. Egyptian planes were flying over
us unhindered. Egyptian troops were pouring into the area, and
the prisoners were 8shouting, 'Just you wait, the Egyptian army
will slaughter you."'
General Biro had received orders to move to Ras Sudar and
prepare for another parachute insertion. He did not have enough
soldiers to guard or move the prisoners of war (POWs), and he
feared that they would compromise his position. 9 "We couldn't
10
take care of anything else before we got done with them."
Therefore, he "shot the prisoners of war in the Mitla Pass ... [as
he] did not have time ,to deal with POWs.
So whoever we

4.

Doug Struck, Israeli Military's "Purity of Arms" Image Attacked,

SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 2, 1995. at A15.

5.
Gellman, supra note 2; see also Barton Gellman, Israel Tries to Come to
Terms With Reported War Atrocities. HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 20, 1995, at A33
[hereinafter GeIlman 21.
For a detailed discussion of Operation Kadesh, see ARIEL SHARON, WARRIOR:
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OFARIEL SHARON 141-53 (1989). The mission of Captain Biro's
battalion was to capture and hold the pass until relieved by advancing Israeli
mechanized forces. Id. at 142.
6.
Eric Silver, IsraelisAdmit War Crimes; Six Day War Atrocities: Veteran's
Account of Captives In Egyptian Uniforms Being Shot In the Desert Adds Fuel to
Scandal; "A Prisonerwas Given a Shovel and Started to Dig. Then he was FiredAt,"
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 18, 1995, at 13.
7.
Struck, supra note 4.

8.
Silver, supra note 6.
Newspaper accounts described these 49
prisoners differently. Some say the prisoners were civilian contractors working
near a quarry. See Marjorie Miller, New POW Allegations Rock Israel Army, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1995, at A8 (calling the victims civilian workers); David Lamb,
Egypt Toughens Position on POW Probe, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 8, 1995, at
A20. Other newspaper stories identify the prisoners as Egyptian soldiers. See
Gellman 2, supranote 5 (identifying the victims as enemy soldiers).
9.
Silver, supra note 6.
10.
Ohad Gozani, Israelis Tell of Massacre, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 16,
1995, at 8.
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managed to screw, we screwed." 1
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He and his lieutenant did this

by having the prisoners lie face down in the sand. "Ihad a Karl
Gustov I had taken from the Egyptians.

My officer had an Uzi.

The Egyptian prisoners were sitting there with their faces turned
to us. We turned to them with our loaded guns and shot them.

Magazine after magazine.

They didn't get a chance to react.

12

"They didn't cry out."13 "One escaped with bullets in the chest
and in the leg, but came back on all fours because he was
thirsty.' 14
His solution towards this wounded prisoner of war
was simple, "I'm not responsible for the enemy's stupidity, and
surely he very quickly found himself together with his friends
[dead]."' 5
When asked about who gave the order to kill the prisoners,
General Biro replied that his commander "didn't give an explicit
instruction, and I didn't ask for one. Only a fool can ask his
commander for permission to do what he has to do." 16 General
Biro then went on to boast about an interrogation technique he
used on three thirsty Egyptian POWs. His intelligence officer tried
to question these prisoners, but their only response was "Water,
water, water." 17 General Biro then recalled:
I got tired of all this nonsense. I took my water canteen, opened it,
and poured the contents on the ground slowly, slowly in front of
the Egyptian officer's face.... One broke down and talked. I
closed the canteen, put it back in my belt, pulled my gun out, and
gave each of the three a bullet in the head. 18

On another occasion, he admitted ordering his soldiers to kill a
truckload of Egyptian soldiers "and irregulars" that were moving

towards Ras-al-Sudr, an oil port on the Gulf of Suez. 19
"Six
survived the initial bursts of gunfire.... They later went to sleep

11.
Gellman, supra note 2; see also Try War Criminals,Egypt Urges Israel,
CHI. TRm., Aug. 23, 1995, at 15A.
12.
Serge Schmemann. After a General Tells of Killing P.O.W.'s in 1956,
IsraelisArgue Over Ethics of War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at A5.
13.
Silver. supranote 6.
14.
See Gozani, supra note 10; Marjorie Miller, Israel to Probe Deaths of
Egyptian POWs in '56; Sinai: At Cairo's Request, Defense Officials Will Investigate
General's Claim That Scores Were Shot, L.A. TIMES. Aug. 16, 1995, at A4
[hereinafter Miller, Israel to ProbeDeaths].
15.
Miller, Israel to Probe Deaths. supra note 14; see also Gozani, supra
note 10.
16.
Miller, Israel to Probe Deaths, supranote 14.
17.
Struck, supra note 4.
18.
Id. Another account stated that General Biro taunted the thirsty
Egyptian prisoners "by pouring water from his canteen into the sand" and then
killing them with a captured Egyptian automatic weapon. Gellman 2, supra note
5; Serge Schmemann, Israeli Won't be Tried for Executing POWs; Auschwitz
SurvluorAdmlts Atrocities, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 21, 1995, at A9.
19.
Gozani, supra note 10.
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with the rest. Blood was coming out of every hole in the flatbed
truck and in huge quantities. '20 In all, fifty-six Egyptians died in
the engagement.
General Biro has no remorse for the killings. His only
remorse was his admitted sloppiness in its execution. "After all, it
was really my mistake. I mean, not the shooting of the prisoners,
but the fact that I forgot to unchain their hands after they were
killed and before we cleared off."21
B. Egyptian and Israeli GovernmentResponses
When Egyptian officials heard of this news report on August
16, 1995 they immediately demanded an explanation. In a less
reserved manner, the Egyptian populace reacted with shock to
the disclosures and demanded an immediate investigation.
"Islamist and leftist opposition groups [began] pressing the
Egyptian government to cut relations with Israel over the POW
allegations." 22 In recalcitrant response, General Biro warned he
could implicate several other key Israeli leaders "if they try to
throw me to the wolves." 23 Potentially implicated by his threats
were his commanders during this period, Mr. Rafael Eitan and
Mr. Ariel Sharon, both currently serving in the Israeli Parliament.
After the 1956 war, Mr. Eitan, General Biro's battalion
commander during this incident, rose to become Israel's chief of
staff, while Mr. Sharon (his
brigade commander) later served as
24
Israel's Defense Minister.
Following General Biro's disclosure, several other witnesses
and scholars raised allegations of similar atrocities committed by
Israeli soldiers during the 1956 and 1967 wars. 25
These

20.
Id.
21.
Miller, Israelto Probe Deaths, supranote 14.
22.
Samia Nakhoul, Israel and Egypt Fall to Resolve POW Dispute, Reuters,
Sept. 5, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library. CURNWS File.
23.
Gellman 2, supra note 5.
24.
Israel In Turmoil Over POW Deaths; Reports of '67 Slayings Follow ExGeneral'sComment About '56 Slaughter, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Aug. 17, 1995, at
18A [hereinafter Israel in Turmoil Over POW Deaths].
This is not the first time Mr. Eitan has been implicated in war crimes. In
September 1982, Christian Lebanese forces under the command of then Israeli
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eitan massacred 300 civilians in Palestinian

refugee camps in West Beirut. See Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility
and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of IsraeliMilitary Commandersfor
the Pogrom at Shatla and Sabra, 107 MIL. L. REv. 71, 174-75 (1985) (concluding
that Mr. Eitan committed a grave breach under a command responsibility theory).
25.
See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 8 (Three hundred
Egyptian POWs allegedly were shot at El Arish in the Sinai in 1967 by a unit led
by current housing minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer.); Israel In Turmoil Over POW
Deaths, supra note 24; POW Killings: Israel Says Charges Come Too Late for
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For

example, in 1967, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was then the
Army's Chief of Staff.2 6

It was during this time period that an

Israeli historian and a reporter alleged that the Army was fully

aware of these atrocities, but suppressed their disclosure.
Apparently, the existence of these alleged atrocities were
known by the Israeli military and perhaps even the Egyptian
government. 27 The Israeli military, however, actively suppressed
their existence to maintain the "purity of arms" image portrayed
to both Israeli citizens and the world as a whole. 28 One reporter
alleged that he discovered these atrocities and "had tried to
publish accounts of the killings for decades but was prohibited by

Prosecution; 20-Year Limit. But a Justice Official Calls the Wartime Atrocities
"Unlawful and Intolerable,"ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 29, 1995, at A4 [hereinafter
POW KILLINGS] (explaining that military historian Aryeh Yitzhaki believes Israeli
soldiers killed 1,000 Egyptian POWs in the 1967 war); Struck, supra note 4
(explaining that former member of Israel Parliament and spokesman for the Israel
Army during the 1967 war, Michael Bar-Zohar, recounted observing three
Egyptian POWs being stabbed to death by two Israeli Army cooks, as well as other
incidents of maltreatment of POWs); Silver, supra note 6 (On June 7, 1967,
Gabriel Brun, a Jerusalem journalist alleged he saw the actual execution of five
Egyptian POWs with their hands tied behind their back and heard the execution
of between 120-150 more. These atrocities allegedly occurred at El Arish airfield
in the Sinai Desert.). One author reports that the El Arish incident began after
some of the prisoners opened fire upon and killed two Israeli soldiers after the
prisoners surrendered. See Israelis Killed Prisoners in '67 War, Historians Say.
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 17, 1995, at A19 [hereinafter IsraelisKilled Prisoners].
While the atrocities cited are horrible and inexcusable, there was also
another, more human side of the Arab-Israeli conflict which occurred during the
same time period these crimes were committed. During the 1956 war, Egyptian
POWs were taken by Israeli soldiers and ordinary citizens, provided meals in
Israeli homes and provided tours of Israel. See Carl Alpert, When Israelis Treated
Tourists, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 1, 1995, at 7, available in
Egyptians POWs as...
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
POW KILLINGS, supra note 25.
26.
27.
For an article stating Egypt knew of these atrocities, see Geneive Abdo,
Killings of Arab POWs Called War Crimes Israelis Slowly Admitting Role but Refuse
to PayforMassacres In '56, '67 Conflicts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 16, 1995, at
1 1A. Egypt reportedly knew of the killings but intentionally chose to ignore the
reports. The purported reason for ignoring reports was "fear of arousing a
rebellion within the army against Egypt's peace treaty with Israel." Youssef M.
Ibrahim, Sept. 17-23: Mass Graves; Egypt Says Israel Shot P.O.W.'s in '67 War,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, § 4, at 2. In 1960, an Egyptian physician published a
book alleging he observed Israeli massacres of Egyptian POWs. The Egyptian
government banned the book. Abdo, supra.
Israeli historian Aryeh Yitzhaki worked for the Army's history department after
the Six Day War. After the war, he collected dozens of statements from Israeli
soldiers who allegedly admitted killing Egyptian POWs. Mr. Yitzhaki alleges that
upon reporting these incidents to his superiors, his report was locked away in a
safe. Israel Reportedly Killed POWs in '67 War, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1995, at A30.
Israel in Turmoil Over POW Deaths, supra note 24; Gellman, supra note
28.
2; Israelis Killed Prisoners,supra note 25.
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Atrocities such as these strike at the

heart of the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) long-held belief of moral
30
superiority to other armed forces.
The Israeli government initially dismissed the allegations

under the premise that both sides had committed atrocities and

an investigation would lead to opening Pandora's box. 3 1

On

August 20, 1995, the Israel Cabinet publicly stated that they did
not intend to punish General Biro for his acts, citing as authority
Israel's twenty-year statute of limitations.3 2 This position was

formalized on August 28, 1995, when the Israeli Attorney General
admitted that the alleged acts were "unlawful and intolerable
acts," yet opined that Israel's twenty-year statute of limitations
had run on these potential murder charges. 33 The Attorney
General Michael Ben-Yair stated Israel's war crimes laws, which
have no statute of limitations, relate only to Nazi war crimes, their
collaborators, and the crime of genocide. 34 Finally, in response to
newspaper criticisms on the matter, the Attorney General noted
that Israel was "not a signatory to the Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes

29.
Miller. Israel to Probe Deaths, supra note 14.
30.
Miller, supra note 8.
31.
David Makovsky, Rabir: No One's Interest Served by Probing POW
Killings, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 21, 1995, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File; The Killing of Prisoners, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 21, 1995, at 6,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also Mubarak: Israeli Soldiers
Should Stand Trial for Killing POWs. JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 23, 1995, at 12,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Mubarak].
It should be noted that Israel historians did, in fact, identify numerous

incidents of Egyptian war crimes. For example, the same historian who raised the
killing of 49 POWs by General Biro also revealed that at least 80 Israel POWs were
murdered by their Egyptian captors in the 1973 war. See Israel Calls on Egypt to
Condemn War "Lies"Against Ambassador, Agence France Presse, Aug. 31, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also Abraham Rabinovich,
People Who Live In Glass Houses, JERUSALEM POST. Sept. 8. 1995, at 6, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (citing numerous incidences of Egyptian
soldiers killing prisoners); Lisa Beyer, A Soldier's Confession; Admitting to Killing
Egyptian POWs in 1956, a Veteran Stirs a Nation's Conscience, TIME MAG., Aug. 28,
1995, at 21 (citing several instances where both Israeli and Egyptian soldiers are
alleged to have murdered POWs).
32.
Israeli Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated version), 5742-1982, ch.
1, § 9; see also Schmemann, supra note 18. and Israel Can't Prosecutefor POW
Killings, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at A9.
33.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATE OF ISRAEL, DECISION OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL (Aug. 28, 1995) [hereinafter DECISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL]; A-G: No
Basis for Trials In Alleged POW Killings, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 29, 1995, at 1,
availablein LEXIS. News Library. CURNWS File [hereinafter A-G].
34.
A-G, supra note 33.
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Against Humanity of 1968."3 5 While expressing regret over the
alleged incidents, he concluded Israeli officials could take no legal
action against General Biro or any other person involved in the
murder of POWs.
Egypt's response to these disclosures was restrained.
Initially, they chose to handle the matter "quietly through
diplomatic channels because [the allegations] cannot be resolved
through the media."3 6 Egypt steadfastly maintained, however,
that war crimes are not subject to statute of limitations. 3 7 It was
not until August 14, 1995, that Egypt officially responded to the
On this date, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr
news reports.
Moussa disclosed that his offices had requested a report of the
Opposition newspapers in Egypt, however,
alleged killings. 3 8
began urging retribution against Israel. 39 On August 19, 1995,
an Egyptian lawyer stated he was suing Israel in a Cairo court

seeking $100 million dollars in compensation for the families of

executed POWs. 40

By August 22, 1995, under growing public

pressure, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called for an
investigation of the alleged offenses and punishment for any
former soldier who may have committed such atrocities. 4 1 The
Egyptian government was concerned about ensuring that the
quarrel did not escalate. 42 Yet, Israel refused to open a formal
43
inquiry into the alleged atrocities.

35.
Id. Apparently, the Attorney General is referring to G.A. Res. 2391
which states that statutes of limitations are not applicable to war crimes. See
Infra notes 137, 138 and accompanying text.
Sao Tome E princpe; Egypt's Ambassador on Handling of POW Issue,
36.
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 2, 1995, (Source: Voice of the Arabs,
Cairo, in Arabic 0515 gmt 1 Sep 95), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File (telephone interview of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel, Muhammad
Basyuni, by Muhammad al-Aswad in Cairo).
Id.
37.
38.
Mubarak, supranote 31.
Egypt Outraged by Reported POW Killings, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug.
39.
19, 1995, atA3.
Egyptian Lawyer Threatens to Sue Israel for $1 00m. Over Alleged
40.
Killings, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
Basslouny: We Have Not Yet Received Report on POW Killings.
41.
JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 24, 1995, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File; Kurdish Conflict; Egyptian Papers Criticize Israel Over POW Issue, Demand
Damagesand Trials, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 30, 1995 (Source:
MENA news agency, Cairo, in Arabic 0605 gmt 29 Aug 95), available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File; see also Nakhoul, supranote 22.
42.
Mubarak,supra note 31.
43.
See Killing of Egyptian POWs Creates Tension, Anti-Israeli Feelings,

Compass Newswlre, Sept. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
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On August 31, 1995, President Mubarak used public
diplomacy to raise the issue to the international community.
During an interview with German radio and television, he stated
his government's position. Essentially, President Mubarak did
not criticize Israel; rather, he condemned the potential individual
perpetrators of the crimes. President Mubarak demanded "an
investigation, at least to inform the public." 44 He also discussed
the incident with an Israeli television journalist at which time he
again requested Israel to investigate the incident. 45 To support its
request for an investigation, the Egyptian government submitted
three matters to the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister when he
visited Cairo on September 4, 1995. First, Egypt presented a list
of names of Israeli officers and soldiers suspected of committing
the atrocities. Second, Egypt proposed a combined commission of
inquiry into the matter. Specifically, it demanded "that Israel
hold a serious, fair and just inquiry based on facts into the issue
of the killing[s] ...
,, 464 7 Third, Egypt demanded that Israel
apologize for the incidents.
Israel responded to Egypt's demands by stating that "it would
provide Egypt with full information on Egyptian POWs killed by
Israeli soldiers in 1956 and 1967, but ruled out any official
apology or the prosecution of those responsible." 4 8 This response
was unacceptable to Egypt. Consequently, Egyptian Foreign
Minister Amr Moussa publicly repeated Egypt's demands.
"Egypt's position is clear: It calls for an immediate investigation
into this grave matter, especially when there is an unequivocal
(Israeli) confession to the killings." 49 Israeli Deputy Foreign
44.
Sao Tome E Principe; Mubarak Interviewed on POW Issue, Iraq, Bosnia,
Sudan, Elections, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 2, 1995 (Source:
MENA news agency, Cairo, in Arabic 1330 gmt 31 Aug 95), available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
45.
Nigeria;Mubarak Speaks to Israeli TV on POW Issue, Peace Process,Iraq,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 4, 1995 (Source: Channel 2 TV,
Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1700 gmt 1 Sep 95), available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
46.
Baz Demands that Israel Should Hold Inquiry into POW Affair, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 9, 1995 (Source: Arab Republic of Egypt
Radio, Cairo, in Arabic 1730 gmt 6 Sep 95), available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
47.
Report: Egyptians to Present List of IDF Men Who Allegedly Murdered
POWs, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter Egyptians to PresentList).

48.
Lee Keath, Israel Rules Out Apology for Killings of Egyptian POWs,
Agence France Presse, Sept. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
49.
Bahaa Elkoussy, Egypt, Israel Diplomats Discuss POWs, UPI, Sept. 5,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also Nakhoul, supra
note 22; Mariam Sami, Egypt, Israel Meet on Killing of Egyptian POWs. AP. Sept. 5,
1995. available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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Minister Elie Dayan continued to insist that the killings were "the
acts of individuals and even in international law there is a time
limitation" for punishing war criminals.5 0 According to him, the
twenty-year statute of limitations "is not a special Israeli law, it is
an international principle because after forty years people will
say: 'we can't find any witnesses now, we can't fInd any proof."' 5'
An Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister countered, asserting the
matter was not closed:
These are war crimes and Israel must adopt the same
attitude and logic as it does in demanding the trials of former (Nazi)
war criminals.
We believe that Israel's commitment to the conventions it
has signed, particularly the Third Geneva Convention (on POWs),
should be greater than its national law otherwise there won't be
52
any international law.
53
Under increasing pressure, both domestically and by Egypt,
Israel's ministry of defense reported that it was drafting an
amendment to exempt all war crimes (grave breaches) from the
statute of limitations. This amendment, however, would not
apply retroactively. 5 4 Israel also agreed to provide compensation
to the families of victims of the incident "out of... humanitarian
considerations."5 5
It nevertheless continued to refuse to
investigate the matter, claiming too much time had elapsed to
interview witnesses and gather proof.5 6
The Egyptian government and public reacted bitterly to the
Israeli response-it was too little, too late. Egypt's Deputy Foreign

50.

Israel,Egypt Clash Over POW Massacres, Agence France Presse, Sept.

5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Israel, Egypt
Clash].
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
David Lamb, Egypt Toughens Position on POW Probe, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Sept. 8, 1995, at A20 [hereinafter Lamb, Egypt Toughens Position];
David Lamb, Egypt Toughens Stance on POW Deaths;Mideast. Cairo PressesIsrael
for Probe of Alleged Slayings in 1956 and 1967. Some Fear Revelations Could
Damage Relations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995, at A1O [hereinafter Lamb, Egypt
Toughens Stance].
54.
Israel to Amend Statute of Limitations on War Crimes, But Not
Retroactively, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 9, 1995 (Source: Voice of
Israel, Jerusalem. in Hebrew 0500 gmt 8 Sep 95), available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
55.
Israel Ready to Compensate Families of Egyptian POWs, AP
Worldstream, Sept. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, APINTL File; see
also Israel May Compensate Egypt for POWs Official, Reuters, Nov. 14, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Israel Ready to Pay Compensation
to Egyptian POW Families: Envoy, Agence France Presse, Sept. 7, 1995, available
in LEXIS. News Library, CURNWS File; Lamb, Egypt Toughens Position,supra note
53.
56.
See Lamb, Egypt Toughens Position,supra note 53.
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Minister, Dr. Usumah al-Baz, responded by reasserting "that
international law provides special protections for POWs; this
makes crimes against them an issue not subject to the statute of
limitations."5 7 The Egyptian public acted less diplomatically. On
September 20, 1995, the furor over these alleged incidents
resulted in violence in Cairo. Egypt's Lawyers Human Rights
Committee, which is dominated by Islamic fundamentalists,
organized the rally.
It was held to protest the Egyptian
government's handling of the POWs issue. During the rally, a
man in the crowd accused the speaker of lying about Israelis
murdering Egyptian POWs. 58 In response, the crowd beat and
59
kicked him as the crowd accused him of being an Israeli spy.
"Egyptians are... angry at their own government for not having
taken action, or investigated this matter, or pressed for
60
compensation."
Meanwhile, the situation between the nations intensified after
an Egyptian expedition discovered two mass graves in the Sinai.
These shallow graves, containing thirty to sixty skeletal remains,
were discovered near an air base outside El-Arish. 6 1
Of
significance, the location of these bodies corroborated earlier
reports by former Egyptian POWs and nomadic Bedouins who
claimed that Israeli soldiers murdered Egyptians they captured on
June 6 and 7, 1967, near the El-Arish air base during the Six
62
Day War.
C. Egypt's Legal Actions
In part because of Israel's intransigence, the Egyptian
government established an independent commission to address
directly the facts and law relating to this incident.
This

57.
Relations with Israelb POW Issue; Amr Musa Stresses Need for
Investigation into Killing of POWs, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 7,
1995, (Source: MENA News Agency, Cairo, in Arabic 1540 gmt 5 Sep 95),
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (quoting the broadcast and not
the direct words of the Deputy Foreign Minister).
58.
See Mae Ghalwash, Rally Shows Depth of Emotions Over Killings of
Prisoners, AP Worldstream, Sept. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
APINTL File.
59.
Id.
60.
Siona Jenkins, POW Deaths Turn Egyptians Against Leaders, WASH.
TiMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at A9.
61.
Egypt Says Graves Hold Slain POWs, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 1995, at 15;
Youssef M. Ibrahim, Egypt Discovers Mass Graves; Dead Were Victims of Israel
During '67 War, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 21, 1995, at A20; Youssef M. Ibrahim,
Egypt Says IsraelisKilled P.O.W.'s in '67 War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at Al.
62.
See Egyptian POW Graves Said Found in Sinai, UPI, Sept. 20, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also sources cited supra note
25.
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commission was called the Egyptian National Commission on
Fact-Finding and Defending the Rights of Egyptian POWs
The Egyptian Commission began
(Egyptian Commission).
preparing a legal memorandum and documentary evidence for the
international community, citing the facts and authority for war
crimes prosecution against identified Israelis who allegedly
participated in the war crimes. 63 These documents have been
A portion of the
forwarded to the U.N. Secretary General.
forwarded documents includes the list of names compiled by
Egypt of Israeli officers and soldiers who allegedly participated in
the atrocity. 6 4 This Egyptian Commission intends to ask the
United Nations to convene an international war crimes tribunal
similar to that established at Nuremberg and for the atrocities
committed in the former Yugoslavia. 6 5 Further, the Egyptian
Government acknowledged that it would formally present
evidence "at the competent courts" against the State of Israel for
violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. 6 6 While
Egypt intends to file suit in Israel, its Counselor-at-Law stated
that Egypt may present its case before other international judicial
forums. 6 7 The forum he was referring to is most likely the
Despite the
International Court of Justice in The Hague. 6 8
increased tension between the two nations, Egypt's ambassador
to Israel, Mohammed Bassiouni, continued to emphasize that the
alleged incidents "would not affect the peace treaty between the
69
two countries."
By this time, several Egyptian attorneys had filed suits in
local courts against Israel claiming $40 billion in damages on

behalf of the victims' families. One of these cases was scheduled
for trial in the Damanhu court of First Instance in Buhayrah

63.
Egypt May Hit Israel with War Crimes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995, at
A9; National Commission to PrepareList of Charges in POW Cases, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Sept. 19, 1995 (Source: MENA News Agency, Cairo, in
Arabic 1620 gmt 16 Sep 95). available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File;
Egyptian Panel to PrepareCharges In Israeli "War Crimes Case," Deutsche PresseAgentur, Sept. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
[hereinafter EgyptianPanel to PrepareCharges].
See Egyptians to PresentList, supra note 47.
64.
Egyptian Panel to PrepareCharges,supra note 63.
65.
Bahaa Elkoussy, Egypt to Sue Israel Over POW Deaths, UPI, Sept. 26,
66.
1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
67.
Egyptian Government to File Suit on Slain POWs, Deutsche PresseAgentur, Sept. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
[hereinafter Egyptian Government to File Suit]; Egypt to Take Israeli Massacre
Suspects to Court.Agence France Presse, Sept. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
68.
Egyptian Government to File Suit, supra note 67; Elkoussy, supra note
66.
69.
Graves and Questions In the Sinai, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at A30.
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Governorate as early as October 10, 1995.70 However, the Israeli

embassy in Cairo "refused to accept the notification of the suit.

71

Therefore, the judge ordered notice be sent via diplomatic
channels and rescheduled the trial for December 12, 1995.72
During meetings in Washington in late September 1995,
between Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, President Mubarak again pressed
Prime Minister Rabin for an investigation. 7 3 Prime Minister Rabin
made two concessions. First, Israel finally agreed to establish a
military commission to investigate the allegations. 74 The proposal
has Israeli historians conducting the investigation and handing
over their report to the Egyptian government.
The actual
investigation, however, did not begin until March 1996, when the
Prime Minister appointed a reserve general, Aharon Doron, to
investigate this allegation, as well as other cases of alleged abuse
of POWs by both Israeli and Egyptian soldiers. 7 5 Second, Prime
Minister Rabin finally acknowledged Israel's responsibility for the
POW murders that occurred both in 1956 and 1967. 76 Some
reports assert that Egypt and Israel have even agreed that those
found responsible for the crimes would be tried, probably in

70.
See Egyptian Government to File Suit, supra note 67; Abdo, supra note
27 (reporting a claim for $1 billion as the sum); Sierra Leone, Lawyer's lbn.dollar
Damages Suit Over POWs Against Israel's Peres, Ambassador, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Sept. 18, 1995 (Source: MENA News Agency, Cairo, in Arabic
0546 gmt 16 Sep 95), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
71.
Billion-dollar Case Against Rabin for POWs Opens, Agence France
Presse, Oct. 10, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 7865934.
72.
Id. According to this report, another case was set for October 28.
which is seeking $100 million in damages. All told, there are at least 10 such
suits pending in Egyptian courts. Id.
73.
George Moffett, Mubarak Presses Israel on Charges of POW Deaths,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 1995, at 1; Youssef M. Ibrahim, On a New Peace
and Old Atrocities: Mubarak Reflects. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995, at Al1.
74.
Rabin Considers Inquiry into POW Massacres, Agence France Presse,
Sept. 28, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
75.
Israeli General to Probe War Crimes Reports, Reuters, Mar. 26. 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Okinawa Denies U.S. Base Lease,
USA TODAY, Mar. 27, 1996, at 8A.
Another report states "Egypt and Israel will also form a Joint committee to
locate the grave of POWs killed in the Sinai Peninsula." It goes on to assert that
the parties agree to "put those found responsible on trial." Report. Egypt, Israel
Agree to Investigate POW Deaths, AP Worldstream, Oct. 5, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, APINTL File.
76.
Israel Admits Responsibility in Massacre of Egyptian POWs, Agence
France Presse, Sept. 30. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File;
Israel "Takes Responsibility"forDeaths of Egyptian POWs, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Oct. 2, 1995 (Source: Voice of Israel, Jerusalem, in Hebrew 1600
gmt 30 Sep 95), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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Israel. 77 Egyptian resolve with regard to this matter is steadfast.
continue to bring it up
"Egypt will not forget this issue and will
78
until we find an acceptable resolution."
III. WERE THE CAPTURED EGYPTIANS ENTITLED TO ANY PROTECTED
STATUS?

Little serious debate exists that the hostilities between Israel
and Egypt in the Sinai in 1956 were anything but an "armed
conflict" within the meaning of common Article 2 to the Geneva
Conventions. 7 9 Even in armed conflict, however, the laws of war
regulate who may be killed. International law recognizes that the

armed

forces

to

a

conflict

consist

of combatants

and

noncombatants. Every combatant in an armed conflict may be
killed. Even certain noncombatants who are aiding in the war
effort may be killed. These persons may only be killed or
wounded, however, under the laws of war if they are able and
willing to fight or resist capture. Once they can no longer resist
See Egypt; Israel Agree to Investigate POW Deaths, AP, Oct. 6. 1995,
77.
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Probe on POW Deaths, AP OnLine, Oct. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (citing a
leading Arabic-language, London-based newspaper, A-Hayat, for this assertion).
Israel May CompensateEgyptfor POWs Official, Reuters, Nov. 14, 1995,
78.
availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. The Egyptian media continues to
flame the public anger over the treatment of Egyptian POWs at the hands of the
Israelis during the 1956 and 1967 wars. Egyptian press reports allege that the
Israeli army used Egyptian POWs "for live target practice, abused their bodies and
sold their organs for transplants . . . ." Egyptian Ambassador Summoned Over
Allegations Israel Killed POWs, Agence France Presse, Feb. 12, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Israel Killed Egyptian POWsfor Body Parts,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 1996, available In 1996 WL 406884; Israel Angry Over
Egyptian Press Reports on POWS, Xinhua General News Service, Feb. 12, 1996.

When referring to a "common Article," one is referring to those articles
79.
which are identical within each of the four Geneva Conventions. The two most
common examples are common Article 2 and common Article 3. Common Article
2 refers to those conflicts of an international character while common Article 3
refers to internal armed conflicts. The four Geneva Conventions are: Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3362 [hereinafter GWS];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No.
3363 [hereinafter GWS(Sea)]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter GPWI; and, Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter GCC], all reprinted In DEPARTMENT OF ARMY,
PAMPHLET 27-1, TREATIES GOVERNING LAND WARFARE (Dec. 7, 1956) [hereinafter DA
PAM. 27-1].
Common Article 2 provides in pertinent part: "ITIhe present Convention shall
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties."

918

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:903

or they lay down their arms and surrender, combatants and
noncombatants may not be killed or wounded. If captured by the
enemy, combatants and some noncombatants have a right to be
treated as a POW. 80
POWs are protected persons on the
battlefield. Persons who intentionally wound or kill protected
persons are guilty of a war crime. Were the persons General Biro
killed lawful targets or "protected persons" within the meaning of
the Geneva Conventions? If they were lawful targets, General
Biro has immunity for the warlike act of killing another
combatant. If, however, they were "protected persons," General
Biro is not immune. As analyzed below, the captured Egyptians
were entitled to protection under international law.
A. Were the Egyptians Entitled to POW Status?
No question exists whether these forty-nine persons were
within the custody and control of General Biro's unit. Therefore,
the question becomes, do they qualify for protected status under
the Geneva Conventions?
This determination is important.
Whether or not the Egyptians were "protected persons" will
determine whether a war crime occurred. The reports identify the
forty-nine victims differently; some identify them as civilian
contract workers for the Egyptian forces, and others call the
group a mixture of Egyptian soldiers and irregular forces. In
either case, General Biro's statements clearly demonstrate that
victims were no longer fighting his forces. If these persons were
entitled to protection under the Third Convention, the protections

80.
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and Annex Thereto Embodying Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 30 Stat. 2277, T.I.A.S. No. 539
[hereinafter HR], reprinted in DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 5, 8 and 12 (HR,
Annex, arts. 3 & 23(c)); L. OPPENHEIM, DISPUTES WAR AND NEUTRALITY 338-39 (H.
Lauterpacht ed.. 7th ed. 1952); DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE

LAW OF LAND WARFARE 62 (July 18, 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10].
Some might ask why cite to military publications. The answer Is simple.
First, most practitioners of public international law relating to war are military
lawyers who have access to these documents. Second, in reality, military lawyers
are on the cutting edge in this area. Military publications routinely comprise the
concensus of contemporary thought in the arena of law as it applies to military
operations. Further, since military publications are used by the practitioners in
conducting military operations, they are the epicenter of any change in this area
of law. See W. Michael Reisman & William K. Lietzau. Moving InternationalLaw

from Theory to Practice: The Role of Military Manuals In Effectuating the Law of
Armed Conflict, in 64 UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES, THE LAw OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 1 (Horance B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991).
For example, The United States Army Judge Advocate General's School produces
annually the premier document on the legal aspects of military operations. See
THE INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, THE OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (1996).
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and
begin "from the time they fall into the power of the enemy"
8
remain in force "until their final release and repatriation." '
Article 4 of the Third Convention defines those persons
entitled to POW protected status. It provides in pertinent part:
A.

Prisoners of war .

.

. are persons belonging to one of the

following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict .....
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof, such as . . . . supply
contractors, members of labour units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that
they have received authorization from the armed forces
which they accompany, who shall provide them for that
purpose with an identity card.... 82

In one version, the persons killed by General Biro's unit were
Egyptian soldiers. If so, those persons qualified under Article
4A(1) for prisoner of war protected status. In the other reported
version, the persons killed were a mix of Egyptian regulars and
civilian contractors. Those civilian contractors should also qualify
for prisoner of war protected status under Article 4A(4), as quoted
The only issue would seem to be the issuance of
above.
identification cards by the Egyptian Army verifying their status.
We may never find the answer to the identification card issue
because the identities of the victims are not currently known,
records of this nature are probably lost or destroyed, and evidence
is unlikely to be recovered from the bodies exposed for forty years
to the elements in the Sinai.
If the circumstances of the civilian contractor's capture made
their status unclear, the Third Convention defines General Biro's
obligation towards them as follows:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
person shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal. 8 3

The presumption of POW protection can only be denied by this
competent tribunal. No such competent tribunal ever occurred
before General Biro summarily executed the prisoners. Therefore,
the captured prisoners' status was never properly denied.
The Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions goes even
further. It provides that "[wihen persons entitled to protection as

81.
82.
art. 13).
83.

DA PAM. 27-1. supranote 79, at 70 (GPW, art. 5).
Id. at 68-70 (GPW, art. 4); see also td. at 10 (HR, supra note 80, Annex,
Id. at 70 (GPW, art. 5).
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prisoners of war have fallen into the power of an adverse Party
under unusual conditions of combat which prevent their
evacuation ... they shall be released and all feasible precautions
shall be taken to ensure their safety. '8 4 The commentary to the
Protocols goes to great length to explain that this provision

includes those whose status is in doubt and emphasizes that

"there is actually an obligation here: 'they shall be released'

85
whenever the condition of evacuation... cannot be met."
The persons captured by General Biro's unit were POWs

within the meaning of the Third Convention. Therefore, they were
entitled to all of the Convention's protections. POWs have a right
to be treated humanely, and "any unlawful act or omission by the
Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the
health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited and will be
regarded as a serious breach of the present Conventon."8 6 This
protection is absolute, regardless of the tactical situation on the
battlefield:
A commander may not put his prisoners to death because their
presence retards his movements or diminishes his power of
resistance by necessitating a large guard, or by reason of their
consuming supplies, or because it appears certain that they will
regain their liberty through the impending success of their forces.
It is likewise unlawful for the commander to kill his prisoners on
grounds of self-preservation, even In the case of airborne or
commando operations, although the circumstances of the operation
may make necessary rigorous supervision of and restraint upon
87
the movement of prisoners of war.

84.

PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949.

AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

(PROTOCOL I) arts. 46-47 [hereinafter P11, reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF ARMY,
PAMPHLET 27-1-1, PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 33
(Sept. 1, 1979) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-1-11.
85.

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE

GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 489-91 (Yves Sandoz et al., eds., 1987).
86.
DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 72-73 (GPW, art. 13) (emphasis
added).
87.
FM 27-10, supra note 80, 1 85 (emphasis added); see also GREAT
BRITAIN WAR OFFICE, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART Ill OF THE MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW
105, 137 (1958); accord MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
LAND WARFARE 103-04 (1959); 10 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 205 (1968).
The concept that a captured prisoner thereafter may not be killed pre-dates
the 1949 Conventions. In 1863, President Lincoln ordered published General
Order No. 100, a codification of the laws of war prepared by Professor Francis
Lieber. Article 71 of the "Lieber Code" provides:
Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already
wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages
soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs
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B. If not POWs, Were the Egyptian PrisonersProtected Civilians
Within the Fourth Convention?

Every civilian has some protection on the battlefield. The
degree of protection, however, is dependent upon whether they fit
within the definitions of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Fourth Convention).8 8 Assuming, arguendo, that these civilian
contractors were not POWs, they were still entitled to protected
status under the Fourth Convention.
As stated earlier, the
conflict between Israel and Egypt rose to the level of an Article 2
89
It
conflict. The Fourth Convention applies to Article 2 conflicts.
protects in toto innocent civilians who happen to be within the
control of a party to the conflict. 90 "Persons protected by the
Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in
the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals."9 1 The only restriction to this proposition
92
would be evidence of the prisoners being spies or mercenaries.

to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after having
committed his misdeed.
Instructionsfor the Government of Armies of the United States In the Field, Prepared
by FrancisLieber, Promulgatedas General Order No. 100 by PresidentLincoln, Apr.
24, 1863, reprinted in THE HENRY DUNANT INSTITUTE, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT:
A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3, 13 (Dietrich

Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1973).

88.
DA PAi. 27-1, supra note 79, at 135-93 (GCC).
89.
See Id. at 135 (GCC, art. 2).
90.
Even if they do not qualify for protections under GCC Article 4, they
still receive minimal protections under GCC Articles 13-26, and arguably receive
protections under the expanded view of common Article 3. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1023 (1986); see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of
InternalAtrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995) (asserting that international lawmaking bodies have been unsympathetic towards extending to national wars the
protective rules applicable to international war).
91.
DA PAM. 27-1. supra note 79, at 136 (GCC, art. 4).
92.
For denial of protections for being a spy, see id. at 5, 13 (HR, supra
note 80, art. 29); FM 27-10, supra note 80,
75-78.
For denial of POW protections for being a spy or mercenary, see PI, supra note
84, arts. 46-47. The United States is not a signatory to Protocol I and disagrees
with denying mercenaries prisoner of war protections. See Richard R. Baxter, SoCalled "UnprivilegedBelligerency%- Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 323 (1951) (assessing the roles played in the law of belligerent occupation
by the military power of the occupant, international law and municipal law); John
R. Cotton, The Rights of Mercenaries as Prisoners of War, 77 MIL. L. REV. 143
(1977) (defining "mercenary" and analyzing laws governing their treatment when
taken as prisoners of war). It should be noted that denial of prisoner of war
status does not mean that they are no longer "protected persons."
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No evidence exists thus far which would support such an

allegation in this case. The Egyptian civilian contractors captured
by General Biro's soldiers were "in the hands of a Party to the
Conflict." The length of time a civilian is in the hands of a unit Is
immaterial. Pictet's Commentary provides that "the Convention
should be applied as soon as troops are in foreign territory and in
contact with the civilian population there.... Even a patrol which

penetrates into enemy territory without any intention of staying
there must respect the Conventions in its dealings with the civilians
it meets."93
Therefore, the civilian Egyptians qualified for
protection under the Fourth Convention.
One of the 9acts
4
prohibited by this Convention is murder of protected civilians.
Finally, it must be noted that there exists no other category
on the battlefield for these prisoners:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such,
covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth
Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the
armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There s no
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the
law. 9 5

IV.

DOES THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAvE ANY OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE ACTS OF ITS SOLDIERS?

Whether these victims were POWs or civilians, both the Third
and Fourth Conventions prohibit the willful killing of such

protected persons. 96 The willful killings in this case constitute
grave breaches. 97

All grave breaches enumerated in the Third

93.
COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 59-60 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter IV COMMENTARY].
94.
DA PAM. 27-1, supranote 79, at 145 (GCC, art. 32).
95.
IV COMMENTARY, supra note 93, at 51. Of course, this assumes that
the victims were, Infact, Egyptians and not Israeli civilians.
Since no evidence exists in this case that any of the Egyptian prisoners were
medical personnel, this article will not address that issue. However, for a review
of the rights and obligations afforded medical personnel, see ALMA BACCINOASTR DA, MANUAL ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN ARMED
CONFLICTS (1982).
96.
DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 115 (GPW, art. 130) and 183 (GCC,
art. 147); see also FM 27-10, supra note 80, 502.
97.
Grave breaches are defined in an article common, with minor
variations, to the four conventions. They are those breaches:
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or
property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
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and Fourth Conventions are "war crimes."9 8 One author has
described
grave breaches as "international crimes
par
excellence." 9 9
Israeli officials initially argued that these acts were acts of
individuals, and that the State of Israel was not responsible for
their actions. This position, however, is untenable. According to
international law, "[pIrisoners of war are in the hands of the
enemy Power, not the individuals or military units who have
captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that
may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment
given them."' 0 0 Furthermore, "[n]o High Contracting Party shall
be allowed to absolve itself ... of any liability incurred by itself..
. in respect of [grave breaches]."'' Thus, international law clearly
places the governmental responsibility for the acts in this case
upon the shoulders of Israel. Criminal responsibility, however,
vests with the responsible individuals.
The State of Israel
ultimately accepted governmental responsibility for its agents'
wrongful acts in 1956 and 1967. The furor, of course, is their
failure to hold these individuals criminally responsible. Instead,
they offered the families of the victims monetary compensation.

V.

IS ISRAEL OBLIGATED TO OFFER MONETARY DAMAGES TO THE

VICTIMS' FAMILIES?
The Hague Regulations make it clear that "a belligerent,
which violates [its] provisions shall, if the case demands, be liable

suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war
to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner
of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
DA PAM. 27-1, supranote 79, at 115 (GPW, art. 130); see id. at 41 (GWS. art. 50),
63 (GWS(Sea), art. 51), and 183 (GCC, art. 147); see also The Abbaye Ardennes
Case, IV UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, Case No. 22, at 97 (1945) (involving the trial of S.S. Brigadefuhrer Kurt
Meyer for the murder of 48 captured Canadian POWs executed during the
Normandy invasion); see generally. OPPENHEIM, supra note 80, at 573 n. 1.
98.
COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 617 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter III COMMENTARY]; IV
COMMENTARY, supra note 93, at 583.
99.
Christine Van den WiJngaert. War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity,
and Statutory Limitations, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 89, 91 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1987).
100.
DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 72 (GPW, art. 12) (emphasis added);
see also Id. at 8 (HR, supra note 80, Annex, art. 4) (explaining that prisoners of
war are in the power of the hostile government, but not of the individuals or corps
who capture them).
101. Id. at 115 (GPW, art. 131) and 184 (GCC, art. 148); see also FM 27-10,
supranote 80, T 503.
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to pay compensation."' 0 2 The obligation to provide compensation
is not limited to violations of the Hague Regulations and applies
to all violations of the laws of war.' 0 3
This obligation is in

addition to, not in lieu of, other obligations under the Geneva

Conventions, such as the obligation to search for and prosecute
or hand over war criminals.'

04

Therefore, to the extent that Israel

is offering compensation to the victims' families, it is complying
with its international obligations.' 0 5 Egypt could argue that such

102.
The Hague Regulations provide, "A belligerent party which violates the
provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming
part of its armed forces." DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 6 (HR, supra note 80,
art. 3); see also III COMMENTARY, supra note 98, at 630; OPPENHEIM, supra note 80,
at 592-95. Article 24(5) of the unratified Hague Rules of Air Warfare provides a
similar compensation requirement. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, reprinted in THE
HENRY DUNANT INSTITUTE, supra note 87, at 210.
103.

OPPENHEIM, supra note 80, at 594.

It should be remembered that the

Geneva Conventions supplement the Hague Regulations and do not replace them.
See DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 116 (GPW, art. 135) and 185 (GCC, art. 154).
104. See H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War
Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 65 (1944) (comparing the Hague regulations with
the Geneva Convention).
105.
While Israel has an international legal obligation to compensate Egypt
for its violations, it is another matter for an Egyptian civil attorney to sue the
State of Israel for compensation to families of the killed prisoners. It is likely that
Israel will assert both a sovereign immunity and a statute of limitations argument
for any claims of civil liability. In fact, Israel already seems to be asserting
sovereign immunity in Egypt. The Israeli embassy In Cairo continues to refuse
any civil summons by the local courts relating to this matter. IsraelSaid Willing to

Compensate Families of Slain POWs, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Nov. 14, 1995,
availablein LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, DPA File.
Because Israel and Egypt were in a state of war until they signed the peace
treaty in 1979, the issue arises of whether war tolls any statute of limitations for
civil suits. See Note, Does War Toll the Statute of Limitations?, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
1140, 1140 (1957). Arguably, the statute of limitations was tolled by Israel
fraudulently concealing the facts so plaintiffs would not have knowledge to bring
an action. Under U.S. law, war does not suspend statutes of limitations. Soriano
v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275 (1957); see also 6 GREEN HAYWOOD
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (Department of State ed., 1943).
Israeli laws during this period were based upon the British practice because of
the British occupation of Palestine pursuant to the League of Nations Mandate.
Great Britain's practice until 1945 was that war had no effect on the statute of
limitations. See James B. Thayer et al., The Effect of a State of War Upon Statutes
of Limitattonor Prescription,17 TUL. L. REv. 416, 429-42 (1943) (discussing various
nations' application of tolling statutes of limitations during war); Charles N.
Gregory, The Effect of War on the Operation of Statutes of Limitation, 28 HARv. L.
REv. 673, 673-75 (1915). However, Great Britain enacted the Limitation (Enemies
and War Prisoners) Act of 1945 which tolls statutes of limitations during war
"while the said party was an enemy." R.G., Limitations In War-Time, 95 THE LAW
JOURNAL 61, 61 (1945). Therefore, at least the argument exists that Israel as a
successor sovereign, absent subsequent legislation on its part, follows the same
tolling principle during periods of war. If this is so, the civil statute of limitations
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action is a tacit admission by Israel of its international obligation
in this affair under the laws of war. Israel, however, will surely
assert that such compensation is no more than solacia payments
unrelated to any formal obligation and not an admission of
responsibility.

VI.

IS ISRAEL OBLIGATED TO INVESTIGATE THESE ALLEGED KILLINGS?

Egypt requested an inquiry into the alleged massacres. Both
the Third and Fourth Conventions require that an inquiry occur
upon the request of a High Contracting Power who is "a Party to
the conflict."10 6 A "High Contracting Power" is nothing more than
a nation that has become a party to the Conventions. Egypt,
Israel, and 183 other nations are parties to the Geneva
Conventions. 107
The Israeli Attorney General responded that not only did the
municipal statute of limitations preclude prosecution, but "nor is
there any justification for an inquiry into these events or those
involved, since an investigation can only be justified when there is
the legal possibility of ultimate criminal proceedings.' 0 8 The
Attorney General is incorrect. The Conventions allow parties to
the conflict to determine the manner of the investigation. If
parties cannot agree, however, they should choose an arbitrator
If the
"who will decide the procedure to be followed." 10 9
investigation determines that a violation occurred, the parties
have an affirmative obligation to prevent similar violations from
recurring. To meet this obligation, a party has a wide range of
options. Depending on the seriousness of the violation, remedial
action ranging from prosecution to training soldiers not to commit
further violations could be considered appropriate. Fortunately,

in Israel did not begin to run until 1979. Whether this argument benefits
plaintiffs' attorneys remains to be seen.
DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 116 (GPW, art. 132) and 184 (GCC,
106.
art. 149).
107. The issue of whether a nation has ratified the Geneva Conventions is
probably irrelevant. First, most nations and international scholars consider the
Conventions to be reflective of customary international law. See generally,
Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.

348, 351 (1987) (discussing the conventions as customary law). Second, only six
nations have not ratified them. Of those six, one is a party to the 1929 Geneva
Conventions, Lithuania. The other five nations are Eritrea, Marshall, Micronesia,
Nauru, and Palau. See ICRC, Conventions De Geneve Du 12 Aout 1949 et

Protocoles Additionnels du 8 Juin 1977: Ratifications, Adhesions et Successions
Au 30 Juin 1995 [DDM/JUR95/3385-CPS 15] (July 6, 1995).
108.
DECISION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 33.
DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 116 (GPW, art. 132) and 184 (GCC,
109.
art. 149).

926

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:903

Israel did not heed their Attorney General's advice. Both parties
have apparently agreed to a joint commission to investigate the
allegations. 110
If an investigation does occur, Israel will have
complied with this requirement.

VII. IS ISRAEL OBLIGATED TO PROSECUTE GENERAL BIRO FOR THESE
KILLINGS?

As signatories to the Geneva Convention, Israel is bound to

comply with its treaty obligations.

"[Elvery State party has not

only the right, but the duty to enact rules making grave breaches
a punishable offence and instituting criminal proceedings,
irrespective of the place where the unlawful acts occurred."1 1' 1
Every nation has an affirmative "obligation to search for persons

alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
their nationality before its own courts." 1 12

Further "it is clear

that it was the intent of the conventions that all signatory states
would be obligated to enact penal legislation which would extend
to all persons and to all grave breaches no matter where
committed. Thus, the convention adopts the principle of universal
jurisdiction . .. "113 The reason for this is that the offense
constitutes a crime against mankind and is considered to be one
of universal jurisdiction, not one of merely national concern. This
duty extends not only to enemy war criminals, but also to a
1 14
state's own nationals who commit war crimes.
General Biro admits to killing forty-nine unarmed Egyptian
prisoners during the 1956 war. Absent some sort of mental
incapacity or coercion at the time the statement was given (and
no such evidence currently exists), General Biro's admission is

110. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
Such special
agreements are authorized by the Convention itself. See DA PAM. 27-1, supra
note 79, at 70 (GPW. art. 6).
111. Christian Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind and the RecalcitrantThird State, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 41, 56 (1995).
112. DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 115 (GPW, art. 129) and 183 (GCC,
art. 146).
113. Albert J. Esgain & Waldemar A. Solf, The 1949 Geneva Convention

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: Its Principles, Innovations, and
Deficiencies, MIL. L. REV., Bicent. Issue 1975. at 303, 339 (emphasis added).
Esgain & Solf also agree that non-belligerent nations have jurisdiction to punish
grave breaches "during a conflict to which they were not parties." Id. at 339
n.165.
114. See Robert R. Baxter, The Municipal and International Law Basis of
Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 28 BRrr Y.B. INT'L. L. 382, 391 (1951); FM 27-10.
supranote 80, 511.
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primafacle evidence that these acts, in fact, occurred. Under U.S.

common law, only corroboration, however slight, is necessary to
convict based on a voluntary confession. Under Israeli law, in
most cases, corroboration of an accused's confession is not
required."15 In fact, if an accused Israeli refuses to testify on his
own behalf during a trial, that "may serve to corroborate the
prosecution's evidence." 1 16 This is especially true once the Israeli
prosecutor makes a primafacle case against an accused. 1 7 The
Israeli courts will admit a confession once it is satisfied that the
statement was freely and voluntarily made." i8 Even in the case of
an illegally obtained confession, Israeli courts still have discretion
to admit this evidence."' For this reason, the rest of this Article
assumes that these murders occurred, the victims were protected
persons within the Geneva Conventions, and General Biro's
statements would be admissible in Israeli courts.
Israel proffers that it cannot comply with Egypt's request to
prosecute General Biro for two reasons. First, it asserts that
under its domestic law, the statute of limitations has run for the
crime of murder, and the only exceptions to this prescription
apply to Nazi war crimes and the crime of genocide. Second, it
argues that international law recognizes that thirty-eight years is
too long a period after which to prosecute someone for

115.
See Ernst Livneh. The Law of Evidence (Amendment)Law, 1968, 5 ISR.
L. REV. 268. 271 (1970). The exceptions to corroboration of witness statements
involve statements by relatives, accomplices, and certain sex offenses,
particularly those where children are the victims. Id. at 270-73.
116.
Miriam Gur-Arye. Forty Years of Criminal Law: Developments in Case
Law Re the Requirements of Fault; 24 ISR. L. REV. 560, 599 (1990); see Israeli
Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated version), 1982, §§ 152, 162, 36 L.S.I. 35
(1981-82).
117. Gur-Arye, supra note 116, at 600.
This readiness to limit the right to remain silent derives from the view that,
under certain circumstances, a lack of response is both unnatural and
illogical if the defendant is not guilty. One who Is silent attempts to hide
something because his conscience is not clear; he is presumed to have a
consciousness of guilt. A suspect's failure to answer spontaneously
during police interrogation may give rise to such an impression, and even
more so, a defendant's refusal to testify in court on his own behalf....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 602.
119. The Israeli Supreme Court has:
held that promises, threats, extended and exhausting interrogation, and
other psychological methods or acts of violence that are not severe do not
bring about the automatic exclusion of a confession. Rather, the court
must examine whether, in the specific case before it, such conduct
actually deprived the suspect of his free will.
Id. at 603-04.
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international violations. 120 As the analysis below shows, Israel's
facially crisp domestic legal arguments become less persuasive
after considering alternate jurisdictional
theories
under
international law.
A. The Applicability of Israel'sStatute of Limitations

1. Arguments Against the Application of Israel's Statute of
Limitations
One cannot dispute the veiled position that Israel's domestic
law provides for a twenty-year statute of limitations for the
municipal law crime of murder; 12 1 however, does such statute of
limitations apply to a crime under internationallaw for committing
a grave breach? The State of Israel knew of these offenses and
failed to take affirmative steps to punish the wrongdoer, as was
its obligation under international law. Clearly, it is an untenable
position for a nation to proclaim that even though it hid the facts
from the world community, especially the Muslim community, its
own statute of limitations cradles one of its own citizens who
committed war crimes. When one nation acts inconsistently with
regard to its affirmative obligations under international law, it
cannot hide behind its domestic law statutes to suppress its
obligations. Israel's actions caused a tolling of the statute of

limitations during the period in which it actively censored the acts

and identities of potential war criminals. 122
120.

At least one other potential argument exists.

Some scholars have

argued that jurisdiction over war criminals ends upon signing a peace treaty.
absent a provision in the treaty to the contrary. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 80, at
587, 611-12; Esgain & Solf, supra note 113, at 339 n.166. Under this argument,
Israel's jurisdiction, as well as any other nation's jurisdiction, to prosecute under
international law ended in 1979 since the Peace Accord between Israel and Egypt
contained no such provision. However, with the expanding acceptance of the
universal jurisdiction ongoing in the international legal community, the continued
validity of this argument is suspect. See Fania Domb, Treatment of War Crimes in
Peace Settlements-Prosecutonor Amnesty?, 24 ISR. Y.B. INT'L HUM. RTS. 253, 259
(1994).

121.
Israeli Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated version), 1982, § 9, 36
L.S.I. 35 (1981-82), provides in part:
9. (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, a person shall not be
brought to trial for an offense if a period as stated hereunder has elapsed
since the date of its commission:
(1) in the case of a felony punishable with death or life
imprisonment-twenty years.
122.
Tolling of civil statutes of limitations during the period of war is not
uncommon. See supra note 105. However, rarely have courts addressed the
applicability of statutes of limitations to war crimes. A primary reason for this is
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The Israeli Attorney General's decision only addresses the
conventional domestic prescription law arguments. Yet, Israel's

municipal law directly incorporates customary international law.

.'Israeli law on the question of the relationship between
international law and internal law - that is in order to settle the
question of whether a given provision of public international law
has become part of Israeli law - distinguishes between

conventional law and customary international law....' According
to the consistent judgments of this Court [the Israeli Supreme
Court], customary international law is part of the law of the land,
subject to Israeli legislation setting forth a contradictory
provision." 123 Consequently, "rules of (customary) international
law are automatically assimilated into Israeli law and become a
part thereof. .. ,-124 Therefore, customary international law,
of a treaty that codify such laws, are
including those provisions
125
the law of Israel.
Israel's argument assumes that state war crimes are subject
to a national statute of limitations. There must be a distinction

that alleged Nazi war criminals, even if found and indicted, frequently die before
their actual trial begins. In at least three cases in France, Nazi war criminals died
with charges pending. but the actual trials had yet to commence. Marilyn
August. Former Vichy Official Inches Toward Trial for War Crimes, AP. Mar. 2,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library. WIRE File. In fact, this author could find
only one such case. Federation Nationale Des Deportes et Internes Resistants et
Patriotes and Others v. Barbie. 78 I.L.R. 125 (Cass. Crim. 1985). In the Barbie
case, the appellate court set aside Barbie's war crimes counts in his conviction
citing French prescription law. Id. at 127. 136, 139; see also Barbie, 100 I.L.R.
331 (Cass. Crim. 1988) (reaffirming non-applicability of a statute of limitations for
crimes against humanity); Touvier, 100 I.L.R. 338, 362 (Ct. of Appeal of Paris &
Cass. Crim. 1992) (acknowledging that no statute of limitations exists for crimes
against humanity); see generally Glaeser, 74 I.L.R. 700 (Cass. Crim. 1976).
However, the court based its ruling by calculating the prescription period
beginning with the termination of hostilities. In this case, Israel and Egypt
remained in a state of war until 1979. Therefore, following the Barbie rationale,
the Israel prescription law would not bar prosecuting General Biro until 1999, 20

years after the signing of the Peace Accord.
A practical issue arises with this tolling argument. Who would raise the
argument in an Israeli Court? From the Attorney General's initial opinion, he is
predisposed to simply use domestic law. General Biro can and clearly would
raise the statute of limitations defense. Would the Israel government allow its
Attorney General's office to admit Israelrs complicity in hiding these facts? It
seems unlikely this would occur.
123. Affo and Others v. Commander of the I.D.F. Forces in the West Bank
and Others, H.C. 785/87. et al.. (1988), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 139, 156 (1990)
[hereinafter The Affo Case] (quoting YORAM DINSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
STATE 146 (1971)) (emphasis added).
124. Id. The passage goes on to reaffim the traditional rule that "'in cases
of a frontal collision between such rules and the statutory law, the statutory law
takes precedence.'" Id.
Id. at 158.
125.
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between municipal crimes and international crimes. 126 "It is a
well-established principle that a State cannot invoke its municipal
legislation as a reason for avoiding its international
obligations." 12 7 "In its origins, international criminal law goes
back to customary international rules, which have long since

prohibited piracy and war crimes." 128

"War criminals are

punished, fundamentally, for breaches of international law. They
become criminals according to the municipal law of the belligerent
only if their actions find no warrant in and is contrary to
international law." 12 9
Here, the municipal prescription law
appears inconsistent with international law because international
law does not recognize the statute of limitations concept as an
international legal norm. 13 0 "A rule of Municipal Law, which
ostensibly seems to conflict with the Law of Nations, must,
therefore, if possible, always be so interpreted as to avoid such
conflict." 13 1 Because of this important distinction, the statute of
limitations itself is subject to scrutiny, especially when one looks
at the practice of Israel and the international community as a
whole.
In 1964, the Israeli legislature, the Knesset, squarely
addressed the question of any statute of limitations applying to
war crimes. They "proclaimed categorically" that Nazi war crimes
were not covered by these provisions. 13 2 In fact, the Knesset
126. The Israel Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Attorney
General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 287, 293. (Isr. Ct. 1962).
127. L. OPPENHEIM, PEACE 350 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
[hereinafter PEACE].
128. Yoram Dinstein, International CriminalLaw, 5 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 55,
56 (1975).
129. Lauterpacht. supra note 104, at 64.
130. "The statutory limitation of crimes is not a principle recognized by all
States in their internal legislation, and it has certainly not crystallized as an
international legal norm." YoRAM DINSTEIN. WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE

131 (Grotius Publications ed., 1988) (footnote omitted). In a questionnaire
conducted in the 1960s, a majority of international law authors believed war

criminals should not benefit from prescription laws. Van den Wijngaert, supra
note 99, at 94. In 1953. a report asserted that the concept of a statute of
limitations "did not exist in present International Law." Report on the 1953
Committee on InternationalCriminal Jurisdiction,U.N. GAOR. 9th Sess., Supp. No.
12, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1953); see also U.N. GAOR. Int'l Crim. Jurisdiction
Comm.. 8th Sess., 19th mtg.. at 13-20, U.N. Doc. Aac.65/SR 19 (1953); Friedl
Weiss, Time Limitsfor the Prosecutionof CrimesAgainst InternationalLaw, 53 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'LL. 163, 185 (1982).
131. PEACE. supra note 127, at 46. "'[Hiowever, in cases of a frontal
collision between such rules and the statutory law, the statutory law takes

precedence.'" The Affo Case, supra note 123, at 156 (quoting YORAM DINSTEIN.
INTERNATIONAL LAWAND THE STATE 146 (1971)).

132.

Dr. Natan Lerner, Statement at the Symposium on War Crimes. Crimes

Against Humanity and Statutory Limitations (May 28. 1968) [hereinafter Lerner
Statement].
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Committee on Foreign Relations and Security conveyed to all
governments with whom it had diplomatic relations "deep
concern" that Nazis war criminals might elude justice because of
national statutes of limitations. 1 3 3 In furtherance of its efforts,
the Knesset, as early as 1950, enacted legislation excepting Nazi
war criminals from its prescription laws.' 3 4 In June 1964, a
Declaration of the International Conference of Jurists held in
Warsaw proclaimed:
[In international law, there is no principle establishing periods of
limitation in general and a period of limitation for the prosecution
of war crimes... It would be a violation of international law if a
country... refused to prosecute Nazi crimes on the pretext that
the crimes in question were merely individual homicides
35
punishable under ordinary law. 1

Israel would be hard pressed to argue that there exists a
distinction between Nazi war criminals and multiple murder war
criminals.
The international community has adopted specific standards for
the non-applicability of a statute of limitations for war crimes. A
1966 study, ordered by the U.N. Secretary-General, concluded:
[ilnternational crimes are fundamentally different from ordinary
domestic crimes and that the reasons normally invoked in favour of
statutory limitation for crimes under municipal law do not apply to
them. It furthermore interpreted the silence of all international
legal texts adopted after the Second World War on that point as
deliberate acceptance by the international "legislator" of the
36
principle of "non-prescription" of those crimes. 1

In addition, in 1968, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
Resolution 2391.137

This U.N. Resolution adopts a legislative

approach by creating a convention that prohibits the applicability

133.
134.

Id.
See Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950, §12,

reprinted In FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 162 (J. Badi ed., 1961)

[hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL LAwS]. Early on, the Knesset established its concern for
the statute of limitations for war criminals. The very first new criminal laws
passed after Israel's independence were the Punishment of Nazi Collaborators
and Punishment of Genocide Laws which excepted these international crimes
from the national statute of limitations. Gabriel Bach, Development of Criminal
Law in Israel During the 25 Years of Its Existence, 9 ISR. L. REV. 568, 572 (1974).
135. Lerner Statement, supra note 132.
136. Weiss, supra note 130, at 180 (footnotes omitted) (citing U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/906 (1966)).
137. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73
[hereinafter Statute of Limitations Convention], reprinted in THE HENRY DUNANT
INSTITUTE, supra note 87, at 925; see also Rob Kent, Letter to the Editor, OBSERVER,

Sept. 10, 1995 (arguing that Israel's refusal to prosecute veterans who killed
Egyptian POWs is contrary to international law).
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of any statute of limitations for grave breaches enumerated in the
Geneva Conventions. 138 Israel has yet to ratify this convention;
however, they did vote in favor of its passage and subsequent
implementation. 13 9
Unfortunately, given that only forty-one
nations are party to the convention,1 40 one must question its
citation alone as definitive international legal authority.
Why have only 41 of the 185 U.N. members ratified this
treaty? Many countries, including Israel, while embracing the
general concept, did not sign the Convention because they
objected to the wording used in portions of it. 14 1 They found the

broad defmitions of "crimes against humanity" disconcerting. 14 2
Instead of ratifying this Convention, the European nations opted
to draft another treaty with more palatable language.' 4 3
Nevertheless, the tenor within the international community favors
the general principle of the non-applicability of prescription
laws.144 To this extent, the Convention may reflect customary
international law. This argument is reinforced when one looks at
the practice of nations, especially that of Israel.
If one looks at Israel's consistent practice before the General
Assembly regarding the obligation to search for, arrest, and
punish war criminals, this argument carries weight. Israeli law
can and should be viewed in light of what it professes to the

138.
Statute of Limitations Convention, supra note 137, at 75 (art. 1(a)).
For a thorough discussion of this Convention, see Robert H. Miller,
The
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
CrimesAgainst Humanity. 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1971).
139.
See THE HENRY DUNANT INSTITUTE, supranote 87, at 928.
140. Telephone Interview with a U.N. Treaty Section research assistant (Oct.
24, 1995).
141.
For the Israeli perspective of this Convention, see Natan Lerner, The
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes, 4 ISR. L.
REv. 512, 535 (1969). It is clear from press releases by the U.S. delegation to the
Convention that the U.S. favored the Convention "to make clear that under
international law there are no periods of limitation applicable to war crimes."
Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Press
Releases U.S.-U.N. 220 (Nov. 26, 1968)); see also DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL

OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (REv. A)/ FMFM 1-10, S6.2.5.3 (1989) ("There is no statute
of limitations on the prosecution of war crimes....").
142. See THE HENRY DUNANT INSTITUTE, supra note 87, at 933; Polyukhovich
v. Commonwealth of Australia, 91 I.L.R. 1, 35 (Austl. 1991). They were also
concerned about the retroactive effect the Convention may have on any crimes for
which the statute of limitations had already lapsed.

143.

European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations

to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, openedfor signature Jan. 25, 1974,
13 I.L.M. 540 (1974). However, even this Convention is of limited precedential
value because not enough European countries have ratified it either.
144. See, e.g., JK v. Public Prosecutor, 87 I.L.R. 93 (HR 1981) (Neth.)
(holding Dutch domestic statute of limitation law does not apply to violations of
the laws of war). But see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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international community. Israel has consistently voted for U.N.

resolutions promoting the arrest, extradition, and punishment of
war criminals. One of the more important of these affirmations
occurred with U.N. Resolution 3074, Principlesof internationalcooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of

persons guilty of war crimes and crimes againsthumanity.14 5 This
Resolution provides in pertinent part:
that the United Nations, in pursuance of the principles and
...
purposes set forth in the Charter concerning the promotion of cooperation between peoples and the maintenance of international
peace and security, proclaims the following principles of
international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and
punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity:
War crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are
1.
committed, shall be subject to investigation and the persons
against whom there is evidence that they have committed
such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if
found guilty, to punishment.

145. G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2187th plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Docs. A/9326 and A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.N.Y.B. 573, U.N. Sales No. E.75.1.1; see also 14 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.
SERIES I: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1972-1974, 304-05

(Dusan J. DJonovich ed., 1978). The vote was 94-6 with 29 abstentions and 12
delegates absent. Id. at 153. Both Egypt and Israel voted in favor of this
resolution. Id.
Other General Assembly resolutions realirming a nation's obligations towards
war criminals include: G-A. Res. 3, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 32d
plen. mtg.. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946) (Extradition and Punishment of War
Criminals); G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 55th plen. mtg.,

at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946) (Affirmation of the Principles of
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal); G.A.
Res. 170, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 102d plen. mtg.. at 102, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947)
(Surrender of War Criminals and Traitors); see also E.S.C. Res. 1158, U.N.
ESCOR, 41st Sess., 1445th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 1, at 22, U.N. Doc. E/4264
(1966) (Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes Against Humanity); E.S.C. Res. 1074D, U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., 1392d
plen. mtg., Supp. No. 1, at 23, U.N. Doc. E/4117 (1965) (requesting member
States to ensure "in accordance with international law and national laws, the
criminals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity are traced,
apprehended and equitably punished by competent courts"); G.A. Res. 2712, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Comm., 25th Sess.. Supp. No. 28, 1930th plen. mtg., at 78-79, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (O.N. Khlestov ed., 1970) (requesting member States to bring war
criminals to justice). All these documents, as well as others germane to
international crimes during war are reprinted in RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY- DOCUMENTS (O.N. Khlestov ed., 1970). Except for

G.A. Res. 2712 noted above, Israel did not have an opportunity to vote for the
resolutions cited in this paragraph. One reason is that Israel did not become a
member of the United Nations until 1949. A second reason is that Israel is not a
member of the U.N. Economic and Social Council. As for G.A. Res. 2712, the
resolution passed without a roll call vote being requested. Therefore, the record is
silent on how Israel voted in this instance. Telephone Interview with Ms. Ramona
Kohrs, Reference Librarian, U.N.S.A. Reference Desk (Oct. 3, 1996).
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Every State has the right to try its own nationals for war
crimes or crimes against humanity.
States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and
multilateral basis with a view to halting and preventing war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and shall take the
domestic and international measures necessary for that
purpose.
States shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and
bringing to trial persons suspected of having committed such
crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing them.
Persons against whom there is evidence that they have
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity shall be
subjected to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a
general rule In the countries In which they committed those
crimes.
In that connexion, States shall co-operate on
questions of extraditing such persons.
States shall co-operate with each other in the collection of
information and evidence which would help to bring to trial
the persons indicated in paragraph 5 above and shall
exchange such information.
In accordance with article 1 of the Declaration on Territorial
Asylum of 14 December 1967, States shall not grant asylum to
any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that he has committed a crime against peace, a
war crime or a crime against humanity.
States shall not take any legislative or other measures which
may be prejudicial to the international obligations they have
assumed in regard to the detection, arrest, extradition and
punishment of person guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
In co-operating with a view to the detection, arrest and
extradition of persons against whom there is evidence that
they have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity

and, if found guilty, their punishment, States shall act in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United
14 6
Nations.

As Judge Baxter of the International Court of Justice has argued:
[t]he actual conduct of States in their relations with other nations
is only a subsidiary means whereby the rules which guide the
conduct of States are ascertained. The firm statement by the State
of what it considers to be the rule is far better evidence of its
position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that
14 7
country at different times and in a variety of contexts.

146.
G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2187th plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Docs. A/9326 and A/9-30 (1973), reprinted In 1973
U.N.Y.B. 573, U.N. Sales No. E.75.1.1 (emphasis added).
147.
R.R. Baxter, MultilateralTreaties as Evidence of CustomaryInternational
Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 275, 300 (1965-66).
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Citing the 1982 statute of limitations, the Israeli Attorney
General opined that General Biro could not be punished. 148 Yet,
Israel admits that its law is defective and is considering amending
it to prevent future problems with war criminals. Israel is of the
opinion, however, that the changes would not be retroactive.
Using this logic, the statute of limitation provisions promulgated
by Israel in 1982 do not apply to offenses which occurred in 1956.
Thus, one must look at Israeli prescription law as it existed in
1956. What was the statute of limitations in Israel? The answer
to this question is illusive, but Israel did have in effect a twenty-

year prescription in 1956 for the crime of murder. 14 9 Therefore,

148. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
149. Prior to 1948, the territory which now comprises Israel was called
Palestine. S. Ginossar, Israel Law: Components and Trends, 1 ISR. L. REV. 380,
384 (1966). The Ottoman empire conquered Palestine in 1516 and maintained
control over it until the British Expeditionary Force occupied Great Britain in
1917. Id. at 380-82. Under a League of Nations Mandate, Great Britain was
entrusted to govern Palestine to "secure the establishment of the Jewish national
home." Id. at 382. The British military government followed the customary
international law of maintaining in effect the domestic law as It eidsted prior to
Turkey entering the war against Britain on November 1, 1914, unless otherwise
incompatible with its duties. The criminal law and procedure in effect at that
time was the Ottoman Penal Code of 1838. Therefore, the Ottoman Criminal and
Procedural Codes continued in effect unless otherwise amended by Ordinance.
For a discussion of the initial legal problems facing this occupation force, see
Norman Bentwich, The Legal Administrationof Palestine Under the British Military
Occupation, 1 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 139 (1920-21). Military ordinances gradually
replaced the Ottoman Code. During the 26 years of British rule, the Islamicbased laws of Palestine were supplemented or replaced by the English common
law model. For example, in 1936, the British military government enacted an
entirely new criminal code. Palestine Gazette, No. 652, Supp. 1, Dec. 14, 1936,
reprinted In I GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE: ORDINANcES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ORDERS
AND NOTIcES 285-408 (1936). Under this code, murder was punishable by death.
Id. at 215. However, Israel abolished capital punishment in 1954 for all crimes
except for a murder conviction under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law, and treason in time of war. Penal Law Reviston (Abolitionof the
Death Penaltyfor Murder)Law, 5714-1954, 8 L.S.I. 63 (1954). The 1936 Criminal
Code ordinance became effective January 1, 1937. III GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE:
ORDINANcES, REGULATIONS, RULES, ORDERS AND NOTIcES 1427 (1936). In 1948,
Israel finally received its independence from Britain.
Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 L.S.I. 3, reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LAWS,
supra note 134, at 8-11. One of its government's first duties was to promulgate
an ordinance. It provided that "[tihe law which existed in Palestine on [May 14,
19481 shall remain in force... subject to such modifications as may result from
the establishment of the State and its authorities." Law and Administration
Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 7, reprinted in Id. at 15. Therefore, until Israel
consolidated its criminal law in 1965, three distinct sources of law applied in
Israel: (1) Ottoman law in force on November 1, 1914, when Turkey entered the
war against Britain; (2) British Military Occupation Ordinances and English
common law drawn from during this period; and, (3) Israeli laws enacted since
receiving independence in 1948. See M. Shalgi, Legislation: The New Code of
CriminalProcedure In Israel, 1 ISR. L. REV. 448 (1966) (explaining the significance
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while the Attorney General's reasoning was faulty, his ultimate
conclusion was correct.
If Israel is to honor its vote for Resolution 3074, it clearly
must co-operate with Egypt in finding the truth; and if the
allegations bear fruit, punish a war criminal, even one of its own
generals.
From the consistent resolutions of the General
Assembly, the obligation to search for, arrest, punish, or hand
such person over for trial under the U.N. Charter towards war
criminals seems clear.
2. An Argument for Applying Israel's Statute of Limitations Based
on U.N.G.A. Resolutions
The General Assembly only has the authority to make
recommendations to the international community. Its resolutions
lack any binding authority in and of themselves. 150 For this
reason, some are cynical of the precedential value of a General
Assembly Resolution.
The members of the General Assembly typically vote in
response to political not legal considerations. They do not conceive
of themselves as creating or changing international law. It
normally is not their intention to affect international law but to
make the point which the resolution makes. The issue often is one
of image rather than international law: states will vote a given way
repeatedly not because they consider that their reiterated votes are
evidence of a practice accepted as law but because it is politically
unpopular to vote otherwise. The U.N. General Assembly is a
forum in which states can express their views; the expressed views
of states undeniably may be elements of that state practice which
can give rise to customary international law; but what states do is
more important than what they say. It is especially more important

of the changes in the new code of criminal procedure in Israel); see also
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, supra note 134, at 5.

In addressing the statute of limitation question, Israel did not enact any
specific legislation in this area between 1948 and 1956, except to exempt the
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators law from the law of prescription. Paragraph 12 in
this legislation refers to the Fifth Chapter of the Ottoman Code of Criminal
Procedure and 20 years being the normal prescription time for murder.
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, supra note 134, at 166.

While unable to find an English

translation of the Ottoman Code of Criminal Procedure in effect in 1956, the
Turkish Criminal Code of 1926 also provided for a 20-year statute of limitation for
murder. See 9 THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE: THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES 44 (Orhan Sepigi & Mustafa Ovagik trans., 1965) (providing an
English translation of the Turkish Criminal Code). For a complete discussion of
the complexity in finding Israeli law prior to 1965, see DANIEL FRIEDMANN, THE
EFFECT OF FOREIGN LAW ON THE LAw OF ISRAEL (1975) (a compilation of 3 articles
originally published in 10 ISR. L. REv. 192, 324, 515 (1975)).
150. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-14; MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 143 (1985) (examining the interaction of
sovereign states through the use of treaties).
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than what they may say in General Assembly context. General
Assembly resolutions are neither legislative nor sufficient to create
custom, not only because the General Assembly is not authorized
to legislate but also because its members, as Professor ArangioRuiz tellingly sums it up, don't "mean it." That is to say, in fact,
states often don't meaningfully support what a resolution says and
they almost always do not mean that the resolution is law. This
may be as true or truer in the case of unanimously adopted
5 1
resolutions as in the case of majority-adopted resolutions. 1

However, this argument has already been countered and rebuked
by Israel's Supreme Court:
While it must be conceded that the General Assembly cannot
enact new law, it has already adopted resolutions declaring what it

finds to be an existing rule of international law. Perhaps the most
important of such resolutions have been the affirmation of the
Nuremberg principles .... 152

Regardless of which argument ultimately prevails, Israel has
already conceded that its statute of limitations is flawed and is
considering changing its law. This will cure this issue
prospectively, but Israel maintains that the change will not be
At a minimum, the opinion of the General
retroactive. 153
Assembly possesses great moral force for Israel to fulfill its
obligations to the international community.
B.

Universal JurisdictionArgument

"The law relating to jurisdiction over conventional war crimes is
partly governed by Convention, and partly by customary
15 4
international law."

151.
Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly on Customary InternationalLaw, PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 301,
301-03 (1979). excerpt reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 105-06 (Anthony
D'Amato ed., 1994) (footnote omitted); see F. Blaine Sloan, The Binding Force of a
'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 1 (1948) (providing an analysis of the binding effect of General Assembly
recommendations on members of the U.N.).
152. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 297 (Isr. Ct.
1962) (quoting F. Blaine Sloan, The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the
GeneralAssembly of the UnitedNations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1, 24 (1948)).
153. LibaL: Israel May Allow Prosecution of Soldiers for War Crimes,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 10, 1995, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
154. A.R. Carnegie, JurisdictionOver Violations of the Laws and Customs of
War, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 402, 406 (1963); see Statute of the International Court
of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945) (stating that the
International Court of Justice applies international conventions, international and
general principles of law to its decisions).
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It is the breach of international law, not national law, that

gives rise to universal jurisdiction. The universality of jurisdiction
for grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions "is original and
not subsidiary." 155 Thus, "[a] war crime ... is not a crime against
the law or criminal code of any individual nation, but a crime
against the Jus gentlum. The laws and usages of war are of

universal application, and do not depend for their existence upon
national laws and frontiers." 15 6 Universal jurisdiction for war

crimes is customary international law. If Israeli law permits the
use of universal jurisdiction (which it does),
the trial of war criminals under International law permits the direct
application of a uniform law of a specialized nature to acts which
are distinguished from common law crimes by reason of their
occurrence in time of war. International law also surmounts the
jurisdictional barrier, as municipal law cannot, by recognizing the
157
universality ofjurlsdiction enjoyed by war crimes tribunals.

Since the statute of limitations applies to Israel's national law of
murder, and not the international war crime of willfully killing
POWs or innocent civilians protected under the Geneva
Convention, the statute of limitations cannot prevent even Israel
158
from prosecuting General Biro under international law.
Granted, Israel's national law provided it with concurrent
jurisdiction for the municipal offense of murder.' 5 9 Nevertheless,

155. Carnegie, supra note 154, at 408; Riidiger Wolfrum. The Decentralized
Prosecutionof International Offenses Through National Courts, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 183, 188 (1994) (stating the proposition that "inlational prosecution based
upon the principleof universalJurisdictionand the prosecution of offenders through
an international criminal tribunal are not necessarily mutually exclusive")
(emphasis added). Wolfrum also states:
[lI]t is by now established in international law that grave violations of
human rights, such as kidnapping, murder, etc., are no longer exclusively
the internal affairs of individual States-whether or not an international
agreement... specifically provides for prosecution in accordance with the
principle of universal administration of justice.... This principle creates
no impediment to the prosecution of international law breaches through
an international criminal tribunal or. based on the principle of universal
administration of justice, through national courts.
Id. at 197.
156. Trial of Lothar Eisentrager and Others, 14 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAW REPORT OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 84, 8, 15 (1949)
(Notes on the case).
157. Baxter, supra note 114, at 390.
158. See generally Theodor Meron, Public InternationalLaw Problems of the
Jurisdictionof the State of Israel, 88 J. DROIT INT'L 986 (1961) (discussing the
jurisdictional theories available to Israeli courts).
159. Accord United States v. List, 8 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
LAW REPORT OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 35, 34, 54 (1946) ("Such crimes

are punishable by the country where the crime was committed or by the
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what is at issue with grave breaches is the breach of international
law.
International law gives all States the right to punish or limit
1 60
the prosecution of offenses that itself does not declare criminal.
Israel's municipal statute of limitations, which now precludes it
from prosecuting General Biro under municipal law, does not
extend to its universal jurisdiction under international law to
punish General Biro for his international crime. It is this breach
of international law which is the gravamen of the offense. Any
national criminal statute of limitation is an act of grace by a
sovereign whereby it surrenders its right to prosecute municipal
However, "[ilnternational law distinguishes between
crimes.
crimes as defined by it and crimes as defined by municipal law
and it makes a corresponding distinction between jurisdiction to
try crimes as defined by international law and jurisdiction to try
In this case,
crimes as defined by municipal law."'16 1
international customary law can be directly applied. As an

instrument of international law, the municipal court must not
look to national prescription law, but must apply international
customary prescription law as automatically incorporated into
Israeli law. Under customary international law, no prescription
law exists for grave breaches.
If punishment of an offender on the basis of... universal
Jurisdiction is effected through national rather than not existent

international criminal tribunals, the national courts act in the
interest of the international community or the respective treaty
membership. In these cases, international law broadens national
criminal jurisdiction in the prescription and enforcement in regard
to the offence, the offender or both ....

Seen in this light, these

State courts act as instruments of the decentralized enforcement of
162
international law.
If Internationallaw providesfor the punishment of ndividuals,
the penalizing can be applied directly Instead of through domestic
law. 16 3

belligerent into whose hands the criminals have fallen, the jurisdiction being
concurrent.")(emphasis added).
160.

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (4th ed.

1990).
161. Polyukhovich v. Australia, 91 I.L.R. 1, 43 (Austl. 1991).
162. Wolfrum, supra note 155, at 188.
163. Id. at 186 (footnotes omitted).
The proposition that a nation may use universal jurisdiction to try a national
over whom it has control finds support in the military tribunals after World War
II. It must be admitted that Germans were not the only ones who were guilty of
committing war crimes; other violators of international law could, no doubt, be
tried andpunished by the state of which they were nationals, by the offended state
if it can secure Jurisdiction of the person, or by an international tribunal if of
competent authorized Jurisdiction. The Justice Case, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 970 (1951) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, Israel has "the universal power vested in every State to

prosecute for crimes of this type committed in the past-a power
which is based on customary international law.

1 64

As the material drawn from international agreements and UNGA
resolutions acknowledges, international law recognises a State to
have universal jurisdiction to try suspected war criminals whether
or not that State is under an obligation to do so and whether or not
there is any international concern that the State should do so.

165

Support for this jurisdictional argument originated with the
post-World War II military tribunals 166 and continues within the
academic community. 1 6 7 Subsequently, universal jurisdiction for
war crimes has been recognized by several other nations' courts,

164. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 304 (Isr. Ct.
1962).
165.
Polyukhovich, 91 I.L.R. at 39.
166.
See The HadamarTrial, 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 4, 53 (1945) [hereinafter The
Hadamar Trial] (Notes on the case). The Military Commission adopted the
following reasoning originally proffered in Willard B. Cowles. Universality of
JurisdictionOver War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177 (1945):
[Tihe general doctrine recently expounded and called "universality of
jurisdiction over war crimes," which has the support of the United Nations
War Crimes Commission and according to which every independent State
has, under International Law, jurisdiction to punish not only pirates but
also war criminals in its custody, regardless of the nationality of the victim
or of the place where the offence was committed, particularly where, for
some reason, the criminal would otherwise go unpunished.
The Hadamar Trial, supra note 166, at 53. The U.N. War Crimes Commission
stated that "the right to punish war crimes ... is possessed by any independent
State.. .. " 15 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF

WAR CRIMINALS 26 (1949); see also Covey Oliver, Judicial Decisions Involving
Questions of International Law: Excerpt of the International Law Issues In the
Opinion of Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 805, 811
(1962) (stating that international law allows a State to punish an offender for the
Commission of particular acts); Baxter, supra note 114. at 390; JOHN NORTON
MOORE Er AL., NATIONAL SEcuRITY LAW 379-81 (1990) (citing the proposition that
violation of the laws and customs of war can result in punishment by any state
under the principle of universality).
167.
See generally Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 800-15 (1988) (providing a thorough
review of the case law supporting this jurisdictional basis for prosecuting war
criminals); Thomas H. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the
Threatened Trials of AmericanAirmen, 15 Loy. L. REV. 43 (1968-69) (examining the
changes in the universality principle of jurisdiction since World War II, its
restrictions, and the proposed trials of U.S. pilots by the North Vietnamese);
Carnegie. supra note 154 (looking for the limits of a State's right to exercise
criminal jurisdiction as it sees fit); GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 46
(1991) (discussing universal jurisdiction, how it is established, and what types of
crimes should be punished under this principle).
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including U.S. courts. 168 More importantly, the U.N. General
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution affirming "the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."'169 This

168.
See In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affd,
776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) ("International
law provides that certain offenses may be punished by any state because the
offenders are 'common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal
interest in their apprehension and punishment.'"); Regina v. Finta, 82 I.L.R. 425,
439-46 (Can. H.C. of Justice 1989) (stating that war crimes against humanity are
violations of recognized international law). For a general discussion of how other
nations' courts have applied the universal jurisdiction concept, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. a (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].

For a more detailed discussion of the court decisions

in other States faced with the idea of universal jurisdiction, see Diane F.
Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2560 n. 91 (1991).
169. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 55th plen. mtg.,
at 188, UN Doe. A/64/Add.1 (1946). reprinted In I UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS,
SERIES I: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1946-1947 (Dusan J.
Djonovich ed., 1978); see also G.A. Res. 3, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 1st Sess., pt.
1, 32d plen. mtg., at 9. U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946), reprintedin id. at 5-6.
The United Nations later reaffirmed and further defined these principles in
1950 with the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and Judgment of the Tribunal. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/ 1316 (1950), reprintedin THE LAWS OF WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE
COLLECTION OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING ARMED
CONFLICT 335-36 (W. Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou eds., 1994). There are
seven Principles adopted in this resolution. Those pertinent to these facts are:
PRINCIPLE I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime
under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
PRINCIPLE I. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an
act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the
person who committed the act from responsibility under international law,
provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
PRINCIPLE IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to
him.
PRINCIPLE V. Any person charged with a crime under international law
has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
PRINCIPLE VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes
under international law:
b. War crimes:
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not
limited to, murder, ill-treatment of prisoners of war or of persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity....
PRINCIPLE VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a
war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a
crime under international law.
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solidified the arguments that the prescriptions, which were the
subject of the Nuremberg Trials, were customary international law
and confirmed jurisdiction independent of any nation's
restrictions aimed at municipal crimes. 170 This customary
international law was codified in the Geneva Conventions. "It is
now generally accepted that breaches of the laws of war, and
especially of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva
Convention of 1949, may be punished by any state
which obtains
17 1
custody of persons suspected of responsibility."
Israeli courts support the position that special legislation is
not required to gain jurisdiction over war criminals.17 2 Israel as a
nation has aggressively sought the extradition and punishment of
war criminals. 173 When Argentina denied Israel's extradition

Id. (emphasis added).
Other resolutions urging states to cooperate in the prosecution and
punishment of war criminals include: G.A. Res. 2583, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, 1834th plen. mtg., at 58, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2712,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, 1930th plen. mtg., at 78-79, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970); and G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29,
2025th plen. mtg., at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
170.
See generally, 2 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 22 (1980) (arguing that international law requires International crimes be
punished).
171.
BROWNLIE, supra note 160, at 305; see also Carnegie, supra note 154,

at 424 (citing a trend in the development of international law toward "universal
Jurisdiction over all serious war crimes"); GILBERT, supra note 167. at 223 (stating
that war crimes are "triable by a court anywhere in the world, although It would
be preferable ... that they be tried in the state where the crime was committed")
Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 20, 1 72, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1992)
("Jurisdiction for war crimes is governed by the universality principle and, hence,
Is vested in all States, whether parties to the conflict or not.").
172. See GILBERT, supra note 167, at 222-23 (finding that "Israel's claim to
jurisdiction is made under the universal, the passive personality, and the
protective principles"). However, the United States may have a contrary view. See
GENEVA CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, ExEc. RPT. No. 9,
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ON EXECUTIVES D, E, F. AND G,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 27. 1955), at 27 (explaining that during the advice
and consent hearings before the Senate, their report opined "that the grave
breaches provisions cannot be regarded as self-executing, and do not create
international criminal law"); Geneva Conventionsfor the Protection of War Victims:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(June 3, 1955).
173. For example, between June, 1960, and October 31, 1966 "Israeli
authorities examined 10,629 witnesses, of whom 536 were heard In the presence
of judges, prosecutors and defense counsel of the Federal Republic of Germany."
Between the beginning of 1965 until 1968, 506 witnesses were heard by Israeli
tribunals at the request of the Federal Republic of Germany, including 269
German nationals who were interrogated. Study as Regards Ensuring the Arrest,
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Responsible for War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity and the Exchange of Documentation Relating Thereto, U.N.
ESCOR, 25th Sess., at 31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/983 (1969) [hereinafter UN REPORT].
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request for Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, Israel utilized the
doctrine of self-help to enter Argentina, where they then took
Eichmann and transported him back to Israel to stand trial for
war crimes. 174 Adolf Eichmann was the architect of the "fmal
solution"--the mass extermination of over six million Jews in Nazi
concentration camps during World War II. Israel did not become
an independent sovereign until 1948. What legal theory gave a
nation, which did not exist as a sovereign at the time the
atrocities occurred, jurisdiction to try this war criminal in 1961?
Israeli courts cited universal jurisdiction under customary
international law as one of the bases for the prosecution of this
war criminal.

17 5

The abhorrent crimes defined in this law are crimes not under
These crimes which afflicted the whole of
Israel law alone.
mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave offenses
against the law of nations itself ("delicta juris gentium"). Therefore,
so far from international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of
countries with respect to such crimes, in the absence of an
International Court the international law is in need of the judicial
and legislative authorities of every country, to give effect to its
penal injunctions and to bring criminals to trial. The authority1and
76
jurisdiction to try crimes under international law are universal.

For a thorough discussion of the events surrounding his capture, trial,
174.
and hanging, see Matthew Lippman, The Trial of Adolf Elchmann and the Protection
of Universal Human Rights Under International Law, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
See also Michael H. Cardozo, When ExtraditionFalls,Is Abduction the Solution?, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (1961) (referring to Israel's abduction of Eichmann from
Argentina in order to prosecute his war crimes); Helen Silving, In re Eichmann: A
Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961) (examining the capture
of Eichmann by Israel and the subsequent reaction of the U.N. Security Council);
D. Lasok, The Elchmann Trial, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 355 (1962) (providing a case
study on Israel's trial of Eichmann).
Israel is not the only nation who has on occasion utilized self-help to abduct a
criminal from another sovereign. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655 (1992) (Mexican national kidnapped and brought to the United States for trial
of violations of U.S. criminal laws).
See Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 26 (Isr. D.C.
175.
J. 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Ct. 1962) (stating that the "jurisdiction to try
crimes under international law is universal"). One of the charges against
Eichmann was a war crime violation. Id. at 14, 275.

176.

Oliver, supra note 166, at 808; see also S.Z. Feller, JurisdictionOver

Offenses with a Foreign Element, In A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
Israel's supreme court reinforced the district court's opinion, stating,
[Tihe crimes attributed to the appellant [are crimes which] harmful and
murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the
international community to its very foundations. The State of Israel
therefore was entitled, pursuant to the principle of universalJurisdictionand
in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its
enforcement, to try the appellant.
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Eichmann was convicted of both war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 17 7 Citation to Israel case law is important because
Israel follows the common law notion of stare dectsis, "and It Is
generally accepted
in Israel that decisions of the courts constitute
178
a source of law."
Assuming, arguendo, that Israel's own conduct in hiding
these atrocities is overlooked and that Israel continues to refuse
to recognize its authority to apply universal jurisdiction in this

case (as applied by both international tribunals and Israeli
courts), this does not mean that Israel's obligations to the
international community has ended. Israel must still exercise the
mechanisms provided by international treaty and customary law
if it refuses to try a war criminal within its custody.
C. Extradition
A second option available to Israel is to turn General Biro
over to another nation or international tribunal for prosecution.
Both Conventions provide that a nation with control over an
alleged war criminal "may also, if it prefers, and in accordance
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over
for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided
such High Contracting Party has made out a primaface case." 179
As mentioned earlier, General Biro's admissions alone would
constitute sufficient evidence to establish a primafacte case. The
question thus becomes, how does another state get custody over
General Biro?
The normal procedure for delivering accused criminals from
one sovereign to another is called "extradition." 8 0 Only serious
offenses qualify as grounds for extradition.' 8 ' The mass murder
of forty-nine protected persons clearly qualifies. If an extradition

Elchmann, 36 I.L.R. at 304 (bold-faced emphasis added).
177.
The fact Eichmann was convicted of both war crimes and crimes

against humanity becomes significant when countering argument which cites

Barble as authority for applying domestic statute of limitations in this case. See
supra note 122.
178.
FRIEDMANN, supra note 149, at 47 (footnote omitted). For a discussion
of Israeli court's development and application of staredectsis see Id. at 48-52.
179.
See DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 115 (GPW, art. 129) and 183
(GCC, art. 146).
180.
U.S. statutory authority for extradition is located at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181,
3184, 3186, 3188-95 (1994); see also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289
(1902).
181.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 168, § 475 cmt. c.
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included as
treaty does exist between nations, murder is routinely
82
states.1
between
extradition
for
qualifying
an offense
Another obstacle is the political offense exception. "[A]
political offense may be an act that although it is in itself a
common crime, acquires a predominantly political character
because of the circumstances and motivations under and for
which it was committed."' 8 3 "[P]ractically all extradition treaties
and relevant national laws contain a reservation on non184 However, it is generally
extradition for political offenses ....
as political offenses
qualify
recognized that "war crimes do not
and hence cannot bar extradition to a seeking country.' ' 18 5 Some
scholars have even argued that to use the political offense
exception in order not to extradite a war criminal "is a serious
breach of the international obligation of every State not to give
asylum to those guilty of aggression upon all law and
humanity. ''18 6

Therefore,

this

objection

will

not

hinder

extradition.
A third principle is that "extradition is to be granted only if
the act the fugitive is sought for is an extraditable crime

according to the law of the demanding state as well as that of the

182. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States ExtraditionLaw, 76
GEo. L.J. 1441, 1454 (1988). The U.S.-Israel extradition treaty includes the crime
of murder as an extraditable offense. Convention Relating to Extradition, Dec. 10,
1962, U.S.-Isr., 14 U.S.T. 1707.
See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 294 (6th rev. ed. 1992)
183.
(footnote omitted). For a thorough discussion of this exception, see CHRISTINE V.
WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION (1980).

184.

VON GLAHN, supranote 183, at 293.

185. Id. at 890; Dinstein, supra note 128, at 70; Wolfrum, supra note 155,
at 197 ("[Oiffenses prosecuted on the basis of the principle of universal
administration of justice are not political offenses, meaning that this objection
cannot be raised to hinder a request for extradition. This is recognized in relation
to the prosecution ofiwar crimes.") (footnote omitted); Lauterpacht, supra note
104, at 90-91 ("[Alcts which per se constitute common crimes and which are
contrary to rules of war cannot legitimately be assimilated to political offences");
L.C. Green, Political Offences, War Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
329, 339 (1962) ("Ilit must be borne in mind that the 'normal' type of war crime
committed by a serving soldier against the laws of war, such as the shooting of a
prisoner of war.., is not in any way politically motivated and may be treated, for
the purposes of extradition, as a common crime."); see also Artukovic v. Rison.
784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986). Some conventions specifically state grave
breaches shall not be considered political offenses. See, e.g., Additional Protocol
to the European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature Oct. 15, 1975,
Europ. T.S. No. 86. Israel, the United Kingdom and 19 other nations are party to
this extradition treaty. See GILBERT, supra note 167, at 21, 31 n. 31 (listing the
States that signed the treaty); Theodor Meron, Israel and the European Extradition
System, 5 ISR. L. REV. 75 (1970).
186. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principleof Non-Extradition
of PoliticalOffenders, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 269, 278 (1963); see also Silving, supra note
174, at 324.
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requested Party."18 7
The fact that the crime is no longer a
prosecutable crime in the requested state is not necessarily a bar
88
to extradition.'
The practical sticking point is that extradition must be in
accordance with Israeli law.
If Egypt or any other nation's
prosecutors formally indict General Biro based upon grave breach
charges under the laws of war, does Israeli law permit his
extradition?
Israel's national extradition law and extradition
treaties seem to preclude General Biro's extradition. The most
liberal of Israel's extradition treaties are those between itself and
the United States' 8 9 and Great Britain. 190
The extradition
between the United States and Israel provides that the requested
party "shall not decline to extradite a person sought because such
person is a national of the requested Party." 191 What about
Great Britain? Just recently, England began the trial of a British
citizen for war crimes. 1 92 The treaty between Great Britain and

187.

Hans Schultz, The GeneralFrameworkof ExtraditionandAsylum, in 2 A

TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 309 (Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda

eds., 1973), excerpt reprinted In INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 238 (Anthony
D'Amato ed., 1994). This concept is commonly called the "double criminality"
requirement.
188. In re DemJanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 569 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aft'd. 776
F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
189. 1963 Extradition Treaty, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., 14 U.S.T. 1707
(entered into force Dec. 5, 1963) [hereinafter U.S.-Isr. Treaty]. This article does
not devote much effort to fully analyzing an extradition of General Biro for
practical reasons. In practice, the United States does not prosecute war criminals
for crimes committed outside U.S. territory or control. The U.S. practice is to
extradite alleged war criminals to other nations. "The American Office of Special
Investigations has removed 48 alleged Nazi war criminals from the United States
in the 15 years it has existed. Only four of them have been tried, two in
Germany, one in Yugoslavia and one in Israel." A Nazi's Flawed Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1996, atA26.
190. Agreement Between Israel and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, Apr. 4, 1960, 377
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter U.K.-Isr. Treaty].
191. U.S.-Isr. Treaty, supra note 189, art. IV. U.S. courts recognize that
international law is part of U.S. national law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900).
192. See Ned Temko, The Banallty of Doing Good, GuARDIAN, July 15, 1995,
at 27 (explaining that an 84 year old man is being tried for his deeds as a police
chief in Nazi-occupied Byelorussia during World War II).
Great Britain is one of the few nations to enact specific legislation to comply
with GPW, supra note 79, art. 129. Their Geneva Convention Act of 1957 "makes

the grave breach of willfully killing a prisoner of war punishable by life
imprisonment ...
." See Howard S. Levie, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of
Prisonersof War, 56 AM. J. INT'LL. 433, 455 n.90 (1962). Britain has also enacted

the War Crimes Act of 1991 which enables its national courts to try its citizens for
offenses that occurred on the Continent. See generally England to Try Russlanfor
War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1996, at A4; Israel's War on Lebanon and
Britain's "Mad Cow" Disease and Nazi Crime Trial, MIDEAST MIRROR, Apr. 17, 1996.
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it
Israel contains no provision relating to nationality, and thus,193
applies irrespective of the requested person's nationality.
Therefore, it would appear that either Great Britain or the United
States could request extradition of General Biro based upon these
treaties.
This may be problematic. First, both treaties with Israel bar
extradition when the prosecution or the enforcement of the
penalty for the offense has become barred by lapse of time
according to the laws of the requesting Party or would be barred
by lapse of time according to the laws of the requested Party had
the offense been committed in its territory. 194 Since Israel's
twenty-year statute of limitations arguably bars prosecution in
Israel, General Biro might not be extraditable to either country.
Second, The U.K.-Israel Treaty limits extradition to offenses
committed within the territory of one party when the accused is
"found within the territory of the other Party." 195 Here, since
Israel has custody over a person who committed an offense in
Israeli territory, not British territory, arguably no extradition can
occur.196

Finally, another obstacle to extradition is Israel's national

extradition law. When Israel entered into its extradition treaty
obligations with the United States and Great Britain, its national
extradition law specifically allowed them to extradite an Israeli
national to another nation. 19 7 This is no longer the case. In
1978, Israel's legislative body, the Knesset, amended Israel's
extradition statute to preclude extradition of an Israeli national, if
that person was an Israeli citizen at the time he committed the

See I.A. SHEARER. EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (1971).
193.
U.S.-Isr. Treaty. supranote 189, art. VI(3) (emphasis added). The U.K.194.
Isr. Treaty, supranote 190, art. 5, contains similar language.
U.K.-Isr. Treaty. supra note 190, art. 1.
195.
Another possible scenario exists. General Biro captured his prisoners
196.
when he was behind enemy lines; he was on Egyptian soil. However, by the time
the executions occurred his main forces had arrived and the land was occupied
by Israel. Even in this scenario, the treaty with Britain seems to preclude
extradition.
197. See Theodor Meron, Israeland the EuropeanExtradition System, 5 ISR.
L. REV. 75, 77 (1970); S.Z. Feller, The Scope of Reciprocity in Extradition, 10 ISR. L.
REV. 427, 427 (1975).
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offense. 1 98 Where a treaty and a statute cannot be
reconciled, it
19 9
is generally accepted that the last in time controls.
All of these extradition impediments, however, are nullified by
the nature of the offense in this case. In most cases, extradition
is not part of customary international law. Therefore, a state is
usually only obligated to extradite if it has a treaty obligation to
do so. 20 0 However, under customary international law, there is a
duty to hand over war crimes upon demand regardless of whether
an extradition treaty exists. 20 1 Customary international law is
part of the law of Israel. 20 2 "This theory relies on international

198.
See Theodor Meron. Non-Extradition of Israeli Nationals and
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:Reflections on Bill No. 1306. 13 ISR. L. REV. 215. 215
(1978). Section 1 of Israel's extradition law now provides that "[a] person who is
in Israel may only be extradited to another State if he is not an Israeli national
and only in accordance with this Law.- Id. But see III COMMENTARY. supra note
98, at 623 ("Most national laws and international treaties on the subject preclude
extradition of accused who are nationals of the State detaining them. In such
cases. Article 129 quite clearly implies that the States detaining the accused must
bring him before its own courts.") (emphasis added).
199.
See Head Money Cases. 112 U.S. 580. 599 (1884); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
600, 602-03 (1889). However, the last in time rule is under increased criticism by
the academic community that argues the rule is inconsistent with the Framers'
intent. See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a ConstitutionalDemocracy. 10 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 406. 425-26 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between
CongressionalPowerand InternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and
the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 393 (1988); Jules Lobel, The Limits
of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71
VA. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1985).
200.
1 M. CHERF BAssIOuNI. INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 319 (2d rev. ed. 1987); Hans Schultz, The ClassicLaw of Extradition
and Contemporary Needs, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 309-10
(M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973); see also United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886) (The principle of international law
recognizes no right to extradition apart from treaty.).
201. BROWNLIE, supra note 160, at 315 n.94 (citing two other articles In
support of this position); Silving, supra note 174. at 324. ("Argentina had a duty
[even absent an extradition treaty] not to withhold war criminals from justice.
whether by granting them asylum or by affording them haven of refuge under any
other title."); Garcia-Mora. supra note 186, at 285 ("Moreover, it Is apparently the
view of the Conventions that the surrender of an offender to a signatory State Is
not at all dependent upon the existence of an extradition treaty between the
parties.-); Joyce A.C. Gutteridge. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 294, 306 (1949) ("[Ilt is clearly not intended that persons who commit
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention should only be handed over to another
High Contracting Party for trial if an extradition treaty exists between the two
states concerned.); see also Edward M. Wise, The Obligation to Extradite or
Prosecute,27 IsR. L. REv. 268, 280 (1993).
202.
The Affo Case, supra note 123, at 156. The Israeli Supreme Court
succinctly stated the interface between Israeli municipal law and international
law as follows:
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solidarity and universal justice, to which the State applied to is
duty bound to lend its assistance even in the absence of any
diplomatic agreement."20 3 Prior to this incident, Israel supported
creating an international convention on the extradition of war
criminals, codifying this customary law.2 °4
There is growing scholarly agreement that certain
international fundamental rights are jus cogens normsperemptory norms that all states are required to respect. 20 5 "The
system that evolved as a consequence of the adoption of the
United Nations Charter and the conduct of the Nuremberg trials
incorporated the principle that universal rules may be established
from which no derogation is permitted. Thus, the concepts of
international crimes and jus cogens norms became widely
accepted in international law .... 206
One of these fundamental principles under international
criminal law is aut dedere aut judicare-prosecute or extradite.
This theory dates back to Grotius. 20 7 Its purpose is to ensure
that crimes under international law are punished and that the
perpetrators of such crimes have no safehaven anywhere. While
this principle has been codified in all four of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the obligation also arises independently under
customary international law. 20 8 Under the concept ofjus cogens,
any treaty provision which conflicts with an international
peremptory norm is void. This proposition has been codified in

To summarize, according to the law applying in Israel, an international
treaty does not become part of Israeli law unless(1) Its provisions are adopted by way of legislation and to the extent that

they are so adopted, or.
(2) The provisions of the treaty are but a repetition or declaration of
existing customary international law, namely, the codification of existing
custom.
Id. at 158.
203. UN REPORT, supra note 173, at 41. This document cites as support the
writings of such distinguished international scholars as Grotius, Barbeyrac,
Burlamaqui, and Vattel. Unfortunately, the document does not provide citation
authority where one might find the basis for this proffer within these preeminent
authors' writings.
204. Id. at 63.
205. For summaries of this theory, see Alfred Verdross. Jus Dlsposltivum
and Jus Cogens In International Law, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 55 (1966); Alfred V.
Verdross, ForbiddenTreaties In InternationalLaw, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1937).
206. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
529, 543 (1993).
207.

2 HuGo GROTIuS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAcis LIBRI TRES (THE LAw OF WAR

AND PEAcE) 526-29 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
208. DAPAM. 27-1-1. supra note 84, at 65 (PI, art. 85(5)).
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 20 9 Unfortunately,
this treaty does not directly affect this incident. It was signed in
1969. The Geneva Conventions were signed in 1949. The
Convention on Treaties only effects treaties which come into effect
after its effective date. 2 10 It does, however, provide persuasive
evidence that the principle of jus cogens itself is a peremptory
norm of international law.2 1 A recognized peremptory norm is
the duty to protect POWs in a belligerent's hands and the killing
POWs is a war crime. 2 12
Therefore, no extradition treaty
provisions that derogate this norm are permissible. 2 13
"It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend
something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law." 2 14 The
reasonable interpretation, and the only one consistent with
general principles of international law in the case of war crimes,
is that the obligation not to extradite nationals only applies to
natonal crimes and not crimes of universal concern within the
world community.
It is universally recognized that the 1949 Geneva
Conventions codify customary international law.
A careful
reading of paragraph 2 of Article 129, following simple sentence
and paragraph structure rules, proves enlightening. It provides:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have order to
be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,

regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if
it prefers, and in accordance with its own legislation, hand such
persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,

209. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. In pertinent part, this Convention provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, It conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character.
Id. art. 53.
210. Id. art. 4.
211. This seems to be the U.S. position. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 168,
§§ 102 cmts. h-k, 331 cmt. e.
212. See generally Fania Domb, Jus Cogens and Human Rights, 6 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTs. 104 (1976).

213. This is not to say that the terms in the extradition treaties at Issue are
necessarily void; it merely means that they must be interpreted in light of existing
norms.
214. PEACE, supra note 127, at 952.
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provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case.

The first sentence of the article is mandatory language, while the
second sentence is discretionary. 215 For the specific offenses
articulated in the Geneva Conventions as grave breaches, "the
Conventions create universal mandatory criminal jurisdiction

among contracting States."2 16 The second sentence makes a
critical reference to the first sentence. In the first sentence, the
obligation applies to "such persons, regardless of their
nationality." This obviously includes the prosecution of one's own
national. The use of the phrase "such persons" refers to the
earlier portion of the first sentence; it is a form of grammatical
shorthand. The phrase "such person" means those "persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to have committed.
. . grave breaches." The second sentence reaffirms this obligation.

Use of the words "such persons" in the second sentence refers to
those persons identified in the first sentence. Therefore, if a High
Contracting Party chooses the option of not prosecuting, it must
extradite, after a prima facie showing, "persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed... grave breaches
S. .regardless of their nationality.' 2 17 Under the Jus cogens
theory, any other domestic or treaty obligation inconsistent with
an international peremptory norm is void.
The second sentence of this paragraph is significant in
another respect. This discussion thus far has assumed the
phrase "hand such persons over for trial" means extradite. Most
other commentators have equally assumed the same meaning. If
that is the case, however, why did the drafters of the conventions
not simply use "extradite--a term which has clear legal
significance? After all, the legal term extradition had by this time
been used in international law for centuries. 2 18 Instead, they
used the phrase "hand such persons over for trial" intentionally to

avoid the issues associated with the traditional concepts of

215.
216.

III COMMENTARY. supra note 98, at 623.
The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, DECISION ON

THE DEFENCE MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ON JURISDICTION BY THE UNITED
NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE
79 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter
TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991,
TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION MOTION].
217. But see Esgain & Solf, supra note 113, at 345 (explaining GPW Article
129 "imposes no obligation on states to enact extradition legislation or to
extradite war criminals even when they are unwilling or unable to bring them to

trial for their offenses").
218. For the historical evolution of the term extradition, see Edward M.
Wise. Extradition: The Hypothesis of a Civitas Maxima and the Maxim Aut Dedere
Aut Jud[care,62 REVUE INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 109 (1991).
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extradition. This understanding comes from the historical context
of when this article was drafted. During preparations for the

post-World War II war crimes trials, the Allies began developing
theories for prosecution. One of the early issues identified was
the mechanism for apprehension of war criminals. The London
International Assembly was one of several organizations which
pursued this endeavor. While an unofficial body of the League of
Nations, the Allied Governments appointed members who in-turn
made recommendations back to them about war crimes trial
issues. 2 19 These recommendations were closely followed by the
Allied governments. This Commission "felt that the machinery of
extradition is a slow and cumbersome business, ill-suited to
speedy retribution after a war."2 20 They were concerned that war

criminals could seek refuge in other nations because of the legal
technicalities of extradition as they had developed up to that time.
It was therefore suggested that the term extradition should be
reserved for the traditional handing over of persons charged with
extraditable offences, and a new terminology was proposed, viz: (a)
surrender for the handing over of a war criminal by an Axis to a
United Nation; (b) transferfor the handing over of a war criminal by
one United Nation to another. Both these operations could be
carried out administratively, without judicial process or
22 1
interference by any court.

This technical distinction was later adopted by the U.N. War
Crimes Commission.
The Allied governments thereafter
established administrative procedures "devoid of all the
impediments deriving from the strict judicial procedure in the
case of extradition proper."2 2 2 The procedures that developed
included the requirement that a nation must first establish a
primafacle case prior to the administrative machinery handing
over such persons to another nation for trial.
Contemporaneous with the War Crimes Commission actions,
the General Assembly was reaffirming this position. In October

31, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution by a
majority vote (42 - 7). It was the first resolution to confirm the
administrative procedure of handing over war criminals, provided
a requesting nation offers primafacie evidence of the accused's
2 23
guilt.

219.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 99 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE UN WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION].

220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 103; see also Id. at 392-434.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 413-14.
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Concurrent with the ongoing war crimes trials and the U.N.
General Assembly resolutions in this area, a Diplomatic
Conference was developing the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The
problem of creating the penal sanctions to the Conventions was
entrusted to the "Joint Committee."2 24 During discussions by the
Special Committee of the Joint Committee, the commentary to
penal sanction text proves enlightening. It was noted that the
current article was already an improvement over existing law.
[Tihe handing over of accused persons has been made conditional
by the clause which lays down that the Power asking for an
accused who is in the hands of another Power has to make out a
primaface case. It seems clear, however, that if a Contracting
Party does not hand over an accused person, it has to bring him to
2 25
trial before its own courts.

During additional discussions over the wording in this proposed
article, the Italian and Monegasque Delegates proposed using the
word "extradition" in lieu of "handing over." The Italian Delegate
also proposed to limit a nation's obligation to search for war

criminals and bring them before that nation's courts. The use of
the word extradition had also been proposed by a committee of
experts commissioned by the International Committee of the Red
226
Cross in its draft of the penal sanctions articles proposal.

The Joint Committee rejected the proposal. The Netherlands
Delegate explained to the Committee that use of this word was not
practicable because of the various national applications and
treaties relating to extradition law. "The notion 'handing over'
was a notion of customary international law in so far as it was
extensively practised by States after the last war in connection

224.
See COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATIONS OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 360 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter I COMMENTARY].
225. FourthReport Drawnup by the Special Committee of the Joint Committee,
July 12, 1949, in II-B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF
1949, 115 [hereinafter Joint Committee Report] (emphasis added).
226. I COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 358-59. However, in its initial
submittal to the Diplomatic Conference, the International Committee of the Red
Cross proposed language consistent with the "hand over" words ultimately
adopted. They proposed in 1948 the following article:
Each Contracting Party shall be under obligation to search for the persons
alleged to be guilty of breaches of the present Convention, whatever their
nationality, and in accordance with its own laws or with the conventions
prohibiting acts that may be considered as war crimes, to indict such
persons before its own tribunals, or to hand them over for Judgment to
another Contracting Party.
COMMENTARY, II GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF
WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 262 (Jean S.
Picted ed., 1960) (emphasis added).
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227
with activities of the United Nations War Crimes Commission."

The Netherlands Delegate also addressed the Italian delegate's
attempt to limit a nation's obligations under the proposed article.
He explained that each nation, including neutral states, should
have this responsibility. "The principle of universality should be
applied here. The Contracting Party in whose power the accused
is, should either try him or hand him over to another Contracting
Party."2 2 8 After this explanation, the proposal was withdrawn,
and no further comment on this distinction seems to have
occurred. Thus, one can see the causal link between the drafters'
intent and the ongoing practice of the War Crimes Commission.
From a historical context and a review of the record of the
Diplomatic Conference on this subject, it seems evident that this
article's drafters made a special point not to associate the
obligation to "hand such persons over" with the legal mechanism
of extradition. The authority they cite is customary international
law. The confusion in this area seems to originate in the
commentaries themselves. Pictet inartfully substitutes the word
extradition in his editorial comments on this common article.

Thus, without looking at the contextual interplay between the
War Crimes Commission and the Diplomatic Conference
developing the 1949 Conventions, any reasonable researcher
would assume the technical consequences of Pictet's use of the
term "extradition." As has been demonstrated, the obligation Is
not to prosecute or extradite, but to prosecute or hand such
persons over to another High Contracting Party. The drafters of
the Convention went to extraordinary lengths to avoid using the
word "extradition" because of the associated technical
consequences. In sum, "the correct interpretation of a given
provision in the law stems not only-though primarily-from the
language of the provision, but also from the purpose of the law,
the flaw which it comes to correct, and from the circumstances
surrounding it." 2 2 9 The grammatical distinction is subtle, but it
profoundly impacts the extradition shield war criminals would
attempt to raise as a bar to prosecution.
Another argument is that any treaty provision that precludes
the extradition of a war criminal violates a nation's obligations
under the U.N. Charter.
The U.N. General Assembly has
frequently and consistently advocated the punishment or
extradition of war criminals in resolutions voted for by Israel. "In
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
227.

Joint Committee Report,supra note 225, at 117 (emphasis added).

228. Id. at 116.
229. The Affo Case, supra note 123. at 143 (quoting C.A. 31/63 Feldberg v.
Director for the Purposes of the Land Improvement Tax Law, 17 P.D. 1231, at

1235); see also Id. at 144, 154.
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the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their
23 0
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
Here, the obligation not to harbor General Biro is recognized
by the General Assembly in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 2 3 1 Article 14(2) provides that the right to asylum "may not
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.2 3 2 This obligation extends to
asylum whether it be dejure or defacto. By failing to prosecute
or hand General Biro over to another High Contracting Party,
Israel is providing de facto asylum in violation of these
fundamental tenets of international law. As indicated, the United
Nations has spoken clearly and continuously of the obligation to
search for and prosecute war criminals or to hand them over to
another nation who will take such action. Israel's case law
supports this argument. "There is considerable foundation for the
view that the grant of asylum by any country to a person accused
of a major crime of this type and the prevention of his prosecution
constitute an abuse of the sovereignty of that country contrary to
2 33
its obligation under international law."
As mentioned above, Israeli municipal law appears to
preclude the extradition of an Israeli national. General Biro is an
Israeli national. It therefore would seem that Israel's extradition
law precludes his extradition for these offenses. Fortunately,
Israel recognizes and incorporates customary international law
into its domestic law, without legislation being required. "This
type of norm, to the extent that it exists in the field of extradition,
constitutes an integral part of Israeli extradition law, even if it
finds no formal or explicit expression in Israeli domestic or
international statutes. 2 3 4 Again, this municipal law must be

230. U.N. CHARTER art. 103. The Security Council has the authority to
enforce or modify international obligations of member states. If a qualified
majority vote results from the 15 members in a Resolution, the members states
are legally obligation to adhere to it and can themselves be subject to appropriate
sanctions for failure to comply with a Security Council Resolution. See U.N.
CHARTER arts. 25, 35-51.

231.

G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)

reprintedin BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW:

SELECTED

DOCUMENTS 381-86 (1991).
232. Id. at 383.
233. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 74 (Isr. D.C.J.
1961) (emphasis added), affd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Ct. 1962).
234.
S.Z. Feller, The Legal Position of Israel as Requested State Which
Refuses Extradition, in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE

I INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF

COMPARATIVE LAW 329 (Stephen Goldstein ed., 1982).
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interpreted to limit extradition only for municipal crimes, not

international crimes.
A rule of Municipal Law, which ostensibly seems to conflict with
the Law of Nations, must, therefore, if possible, always be so
interpreted as to avoid such conflict. In case of a gap in the
statutes of a State regardingcertainrules necessitated by the Law of
Nations, such rules ought to be presumed 2by
the courts to have
35
been tacitly adopted by such Municipal Law.

The gap that exists here is an inadvertent oversight in Israel's law
reaffirming its obligation under international law to ensure the
handing over of any war criminal. Having tirelessly sought the
moral high ground in pursuit of war criminals who committed
atrocities against its own people under the battle cry "Lest we
forget," Israel seems to have forgotten that even Israelis can
commit war crimes.
Whether or not Israel will honor this
23 6
obligation remains to be seen.
While Egypt would obviously like to acquire custody of
General Biro, it seems politically unacceptable for Israel to turn
over an Israeli to Egypt. 23 7 Moreover, Israel and Egypt currently
do not have an extradition treaty which, as stated, is the usual
method of transfer. Of course, Egypt does not agree with this
position. In fact, "senior Egyptian judges and professors of

235. PEACE, supra note 127, at 46 (emphasis added).
236. As previously noted, the decision of whether to extradite is left to the
discretion of the requested State. This shortcoming has not gone unnoticed.
With hopes of strengthening the more generalized battle against international
crimes, the United Nations recently created a Model Treaty on Extradition. See
Model Extradition Treaty. G.A. Res. 45/116 (1991); Report of the Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crimes and Treatment of Offenses, UN Doc.
A/Conf. 144/28, at 71 (1990). For a discussion of this Model Treaty, see Roger S.
Clark, Crime: The UN Agenda on InternationalCooperation In the Criminal Process,
15 NovA L. REV.475, 485-89 (1991).
237. Any complaint by General Biro about being handed over to Egypt has
been previously answered by the international community. It might serve Egypt
well in any future briefs before an international forum to quote the words of
Quincy Wright:
[A] criminal [cannot] complain that he is entitled to be tried by an
impartial and neutral Court and not by a Court constituted by the enemy.
All he is entitled to is a trial on fact and law conducted on the principles of
elementary Justice. A burglar cannot complain that he is being tried by a
jury of honest citizens. Trials of international criminals are watched by
the world and the Court knows that it is also itself on trial. Not only is the
practice of trials of war offences by Military Courts of the other belligerents
established by International Law, but it is obviously the only practicable
course, certainly in such circumstances as those now existing.
HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 219, at 550; see also
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, XII LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 63 (1949) (holding an accused does not have the right to demand that
he be tried in a particular forum; his only right is to a fair trial).
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international law met at Cairo University and issued a statement
claiming Cairo's right to demand the extradition of Israelis
2 38
responsible for those war crimes to stand trial in Egypt.
Conversely, it is probably politically unacceptable for Israel to
harbor an admitted war criminal. Argentina, for example, has
historically harbored Nazi war criminals, and it has paid a high
price diplomatically. As recently as August 1995, an Argentine
lower court refused to grant extradition of former Nazi SS Captain
Erich Priebke accused by Italy of committing war crimes. 239 The
ruling subjected Argentina to an outcry in the international
community.2 4 0 The lower court ruling barring extradition was
later reversed by Argentina's Supreme Court, and Mr. Priebke was
extradited to Italy to stand trial for war crimes. 24 1 The Italian

238.

Bahaa Elkoussy, Egypt; IsraelDebate Peace, POWs, UPI, Oct. 12, 1995,

available in LEXIS, News Library. CURNWS File.
239. Priebke is charged with the massacre of 335 Italians, including 75
Jews. The SS ordered the reprisal in 1944 for an ambush that left 33 German
soldiers dead. The bodies were buried in the Ardeatine caves on the outskirts of
Rome. Paddy Agnew, Nazi Trial Reopens Bitter Wounds for Italy, IRISH TIMES, May
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Peter Shadbolt, Ex-Nazi
to be Extradited to Italy. UPI, Nov. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File; Daniel Williams, Nazi Horror Still Haunts Eternal City: SS Officer
Faces Trial In Roman Massacre, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A19; see also
Prosecutor to Question Man Who Says He Saw Massacre, AP, Dec. 12, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File; Celestine Bohlen, Italian War-Crimes
Trial Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995, at A12; Celestine Bohlen, Rome Tribunal
Opens Trial of Ex-Nazi in Massacre of 335, N.Y. TIMES, May 9. 1996, at A5;
Milestones, TIME, Apr. 15, 1996, at 15; Daniel Williams, Ex-Nazl's Trial, Book on
GassingBring FascismBackIntoFocus, WASH. POST, May 7, 1996, at A14.
The Priebke case Is interesting because of the similarities in how the alleged
atrocities came to light. The Argentine government arrested Mr. Priebke in May,
1994, after he was interviewed by the ABC television network. In his interview,
he admitted he took part in an execution squad that committed the worst
massacre in Italy during World War II.
240.
See, e.g., Oscar Florman, Argentina: Nazi Officer Priebke's Extradition
Denied, Inter Press Service, Aug. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File; see generally Argentina in Uproar over Police Who Hugged Alleged
Nazi. Agence France Presse, Dec. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
241.
Ironically, the Italian military tribunal convicted Priebke for his
involvement in the 1944 massacre, but ruled it could not sentence him because
of Italy's domestic statute of limitations. The Italian Court's 125-page opinion
was released to the media on September 30, 1996. At the time this article was
written, an English version of the opinion was not available to the author.
However, news reports provide a summary of the court's opinion. One newspaper
reported that the court found mitigating factors that allowed for the domestic
statute of limitations to apply. The mitigating factors being, that in the 50 years
since the massacre, Priebke distanced himself from his Nazi past. Judges:
Priebke Acquitedfor "ImpeccableBehaviour"Since 1945, Deutsche Presse-Agentur,
Oct. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Court Explains
Verdict in Prlebke Case, Agence France Presse, Sept. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS,

News Library, CURNWS File; Rome Court Papers Reveal Judges Thought Priebke
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military court found Priebke guilty, but also found mitigating
factors allowing the court to apply a domestic statute of
limitations. Ironically, the Israeli foreign ministry "expressed its
shock at the decision taken by the military court in Italy.... It is
inconceivable that Priebke, who admitted to personally

'Not ParticularlyCruel', JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File. Another basis provided by the courts was Priebke
was just "acting under orders from his Nazi superiors." Andrew Gumbel, Why
Italy Cannot Bring War Criminals to Justice, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 8, 1996, at 13,
availableIn LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Another newspaper reported that
the court found a lack of aggravating factors; that Is, the murder of 335 innocent
civilians was not done with cruelty and premeditation. Prebke Cleared of Most
Serious Charges In WWII Massacre,JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at 1, available
In LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
The court's rationale as reported seems incredible. Obviously, Priebke would
distance himself from his criminal Nazi past. He lived in Argentina to protect
himself from his past. Surely he was aware of Israel's practice in taking
Elchmann back to Israel once they discovered his whereabouts. How this court
found that the assemblage of ten innocent civilians for every German soldier
killed in the ambush was not premeditation defies logic. Priebke admitted to
personally killing two of the 335 massacred and to helped organize the massacre.
Germany Asks Italy to ExtraditePriebkeand Hass, JERUSALEM POST. Aug. 14, 1996.
at 12, available In LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Prebke had to load his
weapon, point his weapon, and pull the trigger at two different unarmed
individuals. How much more premeditation does an Italian military court
require? Finally, the court allegedly found mitigation in the fact that Prlebke was
merely following orders. For over 50 years, the international community has
denied the validity of this defense. The best summary of the law in this area Is as
follows:
An unlawful act of a soldier or officer in obedience to an order of his
government or his military superior is not justifiable if when he committed
it he actually knew or, considering the circumstances he had reasonable
groundsfor knowing that the act ordered is unlawful under (a) the laws and
customs of warfare, or (b) the principles of criminal law generally
prevailing in civilized nations, or (c) the law of his own country. In
applying this rule, whenever the three legal systems clash, the last shall be
subordinate.(emphasis added).

Trial of Lieutenant-GeneralShlgeru Sawasa and Three Others, 5 UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION. LAw REPORT OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 25, 1,

15 (1946); see generally Id.at 14-19.
The acquittal caused domestic and international outrage. In response,
Germany requested extradition of Priebke so they may try him for this massacre
as well as others he reportedly committed. Germany Asks Italy to Extradite
Priebke and Hass, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 14, 1996, at 12A, available In LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File. Additionally. Italy's Minister of Justice Issued a new
arrest warrant against Priebke for the murder of 15 hostages shot in cold blood he
allegedly committed during World War II. Margaret Rigillo, Wheels of Justice
Grind Exceedingly Slow as Heaven's Gate Stays Shut, HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 16,

1996, at 9, available In LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Ex-SS Man Prlebke's
Case Goes to Italian Constitutional Court, Agence France Presse, Sept. 5, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library. CURNWS File; Ian Traynor, Priebke Sows War
Crimes Confusion, GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 1996, at 16.
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supervising the murder of 335 human beings, should be allowed
to walk free."2 42 Isn't it equally inconceivable that General Biro,
who admitted to personally killing 49 unarmed POWs, should be
allowed to walk free?
D. Israel's Options in Fulfllng Its InternationalObligations

Three potential options exist for Israel: (1) turn over General
Biro (voluntarily or through an extradition request) to a mutually
agreeable nation for trial; (2) try him by military commission, if
Israeli law recognizes such a tribunal; or (3) hand him over to an
international tribunal such as the one currently convened at the
Hague. While nothing precludes Israel from voluntarily turning
General Biro over to another sovereign, the first option may not
be practical. 24 3 For instance, the United States (presuming
General Biro could be tried in a U.S. forum) would not likely be an
acceptable nation because of the perception in the Arab
community that the United States may not be impartial. As an
alternative, Great Britain has no political interest in the outcome

of this matter. For that matter, neither does the United States. It
is this conflict between a nation's interest in punishing war
criminals and political concerns which makes this first option
unworkable.
The obligation to search for persons who have committed
grave breaches and bring them before one's courts extends to all
nations, not just belligerent nations. Yet, war crime trials "by
national tribunals of states other than those of the nationality of
the victim, the accused or of the locale of the crime have been
quite rare."24 4
In the practice of nations, governments are
reluctant to settle politically charged allegations of war crimes
absent allied participation or direct political benefits to itself.24 5
The second theoretical possibility is to try General Biro by
military commission. Historically, military commissions enforce

242. Israel Slams Prlebke Court Ruling, Agence France Presse, Aug. 5, 1996,
available In LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
243. In fact, on several occasions nations have expelled citizens because the
national statutes of limitations have precluded prosecution under municipal law.
See Van den Wijngaert, supra note 99, at 93. Many of the "citizens" which were
ultimately expelled obtained their citizenship by deceit and were denaturalized
and deported based upon this deception. See, e.g., Federation Nationale Des
Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes and Ohers v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125
(Cass. Crim. 1985).
244. 2 UNITED NATIONs LEGAL ORDER 1013 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher
C. Joyner eds., 1995).
245. See generally, David A. Martin, Symposium: War Crimes: Bosnia and

Beyond: Reluctance to Prosecute War Crimes: Of Causes and Cures, 34 VA. J. INT'L.

L.255 (1994).
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the laws of war as well as military law. The U.N. War Crimes
Commission aptly summarized the customary law of military
commissions:
As to jurisdiction the traditional rule is that a Military Court,
whether national or international, derives its jurisdiction over war
crimes from the bare fact that the person charged is within the
custody of the Court; his nationality, the place -where the offence
was committed, the nationality of the victims are not generally
material. This has been sometimes described as universality of
jurisdiction as being contrary to the general rule that courts have a
jurisdiction limited to the national territory or to the nationality of
24 6
the injured person.

While Israeli military justice law24 7 does not specifically authorize
usage of a military commission, its modern military justice roots
originated from the British military justice system, which does
recognize the customary international law usage of military
commissions.2 4 8

246. 15 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS x (1949) (forward).
247. Military JusticeLaw 5715-1955 (1976) (as amended).
248. See generally, M. Zohar, Modern Trends In Military Law and Their
Influence on Israel's Military Justice Law, in 5 STUDIES IN LAW, SCRIPTA
HIEROSOLYMITANA 178 (1958), reprint available at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General's Schoors Library, Special Collections. For a summary of the British
Manual in effect contemporaneously with these events, see Carnegie, supra note
154, at 421. The British used military tribunals after World War II. These
tribunals had jurisdiction to try "'violations of the laws and usages of war
committed during any war in which His Majesty has been engaged at any time
after 2nd September, 1939'." HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra
note 219, at 462 (quoting British Army Order 81/1945, U.N.W.C.C. Doc. C.131 of
27.6.45) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the use of military commissions to try var crimes following
U.S. practice, see WINTHROP, supra note 1, at 831-84; Military Commissions, 11
Op. Att'y Gen. 297 (1865) (opining that the military tribunal which convicted
Booth and his co-conspirators had jurisdiction to try the accused under the laws
and customs of war); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Robinson 0. Everett,
Possible Use of American Military Tribunals to Punish Offenses Against the Law of
Nations, 34 VA. J. INT'L. L. 289 (1994); Note, JurisdictionalProblems Related to the
Prosecutionof FormerServicemenfor Violations of the Law of War, VA. L. REv. 947,
954-63 (1970); Sheldon Glueck, By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders be Tried?,
56 HARv. L. Rv. 1059, 1063-74 (1943) (discussing the forums of ordinary
national criminal courts, military commissions, multinational military tribunals,
and creation of an International Criminal Court); A. Wlgfall Green, The Military

Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1948); see generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 80,
at 566-88. Under current U.S. law, this is probably the only forum available to
trial General Biro if tried by the United States.
One should also understand that military commissions are different than
some of the occupational courts which preside over the West Bank and Gaza
strip.
Military officers preside during military commissions and these
commissions can be convened at any time. They enforce the laws of war as well
as military law. Occupation courts normally consist of civilian judges from the
indigenous populace. See IV COMMENTARY, supra note 93. at 302-08 (art. 54).
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The third option is an ad hoc international war crimes

tribunal similar to those currently addressing atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia 2 4 9 and Rwanda. 250 International law clearly
allows the parties to agree to turn the entire matter over to an
international court.2 5 1
These tribunals' charters, however,

These judges enforce the laws in effect in the occupied territory immediately prior
to the occupation, subject to modifications by the conquering forces deemed
necessary to maintain security or that are an obstacle to enforcing the Fourth
Convention. Id. at 334-37 (art. 64); see also DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79, at 12
(HR, supra note 80, art. 23(H)) ("It is especially forbidden... to declare abolished,
suspended, or inadmissible in a Court of law the rights and actions of the
nationals of the hostile party.") and 15 (HR, supra note 80, art. 43) ("The authority
of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the
latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country."). See also OPPENIIEIM, supra note 80, at 453-55.
In addition to local judges, occupying forces often establish military courts to
adjudicate matters of security. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OCCUPATION 116 (1993); OPPENHEIM, supra note 80, at 446-47, 454. The Fourth
Convention specifically authorizes convening military courts in occupied

territories to enforce the security ordinances. IV COMMENTARY, supra note 93, at
339-41 (art. 66). These courts would be military commissions and they have
jurisdiction over local law offenses and offenses violative of the security
ordinances. However, as a matter of practice, occupational forces normal only
preside over local law offenses if the offense is of a security nature or the offender
is a national of the occupying force.
See THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 32 (Isr. Nat'l Section of the Intl Comm. of Jurists ed.,
1981); Allied Kommandatura Law No. 7 of 17 March 1950, AK Gazette, at 11 (as
amended). The copy of this document is in the authors personal library who
actually practiced occupation law in Berlin from 1988 to 1990. For a discussion
of occupation law in Berlin, see I.D. HENDRY & M.C. WOOD, THE LEGAL STATUS OF
BERLIN 65-68 (1987). Offenses by occupation force soldiers are handled by
traditional courts-martial.
For further discussions on the application of occupation law and its court
system in the West Bank and Gaza strip in addition to those already cited, see
ISRAEL, THE INTIFADA AND THE RULE OF LAw, 59-100, 241-46 (David Yahav ed.,
1993); Esther R. Cohen, Justicefor Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court of
Justice Paradigm,24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471 (1986); Yaron Butovsky, Law of
BeUigerent Occupation: Israeli Practice and Judicial Decisions Affecting the West
Bank, 1983 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 217, 219-21; Allan Gerson, Trustee-Occupant. The
Legal Status of Israel'sPresence In the West Bank, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1973).
249.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, SINCE 1991, reprinted In
32 I.L.M. 1192-1201 (1993); see also REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO
ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: SUBMITTED BY A
SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(1993).
250.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 955 (1994), U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995);
see also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res./955
(Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted In 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
251.
III COMMENTARY, supra note 98, at 624; DA PAM. 27-1, supra note 79,
at 70 (GPW, art. 6); accord RESPONSE TO THE MOTION OF THE DEFENCE ON THE
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currently limit their jurisdiction to offenses committed within the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The jurisdictional basis for an
international court could be the principle of universal
jurisdiction. 2 52 For example, the International Tribunal for war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia is currently citing universal
jurisdiction as its basis for the trial of Dusko Tadic. 25 3 The
current tribunal's practice
supports the argument that universal
4
jurisdiction is original.

25

To establish an ad hoc tribunal under Chapter VII, the
Security Council would have to find that there exists a threat to
the peace and security of the international community if General
Biro or any other war criminal is not prosecuted. 255 The United
Nations could make such a finding in this case. First, the very

reason there exists universal jurisdiction over these offenses is
because they are crimes against mankind as a whole. Deterrence
has always served societies well in preventing criminal acts. This
fact has been best argued by Cowles and cited for authority by
Israel's Supreme Court:
[Wihile the State whose nationals were directly affected has a
primary Interest, all civilized States have a very real interest in the
punishment of war crimes. "The unpunished criminal Is Itself a

menace to the social order." And an offense against the laws of
war, as a violation of the law of nations, is a matter of general

JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL, The Prosecution of the Tribunal v. Dusko Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION

OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw COMMITrED IN THE TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991 (July 7. 1995)
[hereinafter PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF].
252. See B. Graefrath, Universal Jurisdiction and an International Court, 1
EuR. J. INT'L L. 67, 87 (1990); Wolfrum, supra note 155, at 188-89 (stating that
"nlatlonal prosecution based upon the principle of universal Jurisdiction and the
prosecution of offenders through an international criminal tribunal are not
necessarily mutually exclusive") (footnote omitted).
253. TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION MOTION, supra note 216,
57-59;
PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF, supra note 251, 1 57-59.
254. Concurrent with these proceedings a Bosnian Serb municipal court
tried and convicted a man of war crimes. War Crimes; Court Sentences Bosnian
Serb War Criminal to 10 Years' Imprisonment, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Sept. 30, 1995 (Source: HINA news agency, Zabreb, in English 1440 gmt 28 Sep
95), availableIn LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
255.
The bases for establishing both the Yugoslavian and Rwandan
International Tribunals was Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. SCOR. 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) (establishing the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia); UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 and
Annex (May 3, 1993), reprinted In 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the
International Tribunal for Atrocities Committed in Rwanda).
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interest and concern .

.

. war crimes "are offences against the

25 6
conscience of civilized humanity."

Second, given the historic tension in this region of the world, it
would seem that the United Nations has a vested interest in
ensuring that the peace process continues unabated.
One benefit in having an international tribunal adjudicate
this matter is that they are not bound by a national statute of
limitations. 2 57 It seems politically and morally acceptable to
request the United Nations to extend its tribunals' jurisdiction
over this matter until such time as the U.N. Security Council
establishes a permanent international criminal tribunal under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 2 58 The International Tribunal
Appeals Court best stated the argument for having General Biro's
crimes handled by this court.
[One cannot but rejoice that, universal jurisdiction being
nowadays acknowledged in the case of international crimes, a
person suspected of such offences may finally be brought before an
international judicial body for a dispassionate consideration of his
indictment by impartial, independent and disinterested judges
259
coming, as It happens here, from all continents of the world.

VIII. WHAT ARE EGYPT'S OPTIONS SHOULD ISRAEL CONTINUE TO
IGNORE ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?

Diplomacy, both direct and public, is always a tactic available
to Egypt. Israel prides itself on being a nation of laws and a
champion of victims of war crimes.
Enforcing the Geneva

256. Cowles, supra note 166. at 217 (footnote omitted).
257. Craig v. Ministry of Energy of Iran and Others, Case No. 346, 78 I.L.M.
658, 666 (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1983).
258. Throughout this century various authors have argued for a permanent
international criminal tribunal. See, e.g., Manley 0. Hudson, The Proposed
InternationalCrirninal Court, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 549 (1938); John W. Bridge, The
Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and the Formulation of
InternationalCriminal Law, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1255, 1266-1780 (1964); see
generally BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIIINAL COURT (1980).

For

discussions on a permanent International Criminal Court, see M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNi, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMmAL LAW (1993).

Pictet himself

recognized this possibility. He concluded that Article 129 "does not exclude
handing over the accused to an international criminal court whose competence
has been recognized by the Contracting Parties." On that point, the Diplomatic
Conference specIfically wished to reserve the future position and not impede the
progress of international law." III COMMENTARY, supra note 98, at 624. The
debate still continues as the United Nations creeps towards an international
criminal court. See John Goshko, U.N. Moving Toward Creation of Criminal Court,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at A27.
259.

TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION MOTION, supranote 216,

62.
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Conventions is the means to champion victims of war crimes.
Israel would be well-served to be reminded of the phrase "Lest we
forget." For Israel to transition to peace with its Arab neighbors,
it must demonstrate its willingness to enforce international law
against not only its neighbors, but against itself. Historically,
Israel has aggressively used international law as justification for
its actions in punishing war criminals from World War II.
Admittedly, the Jewish people suffered millions of deaths at the
hands of the Nazis. However, if anything, that should heighten,
not diminish, Israel's obligation to punish all war criminals. To
argue that there is nothing that can be done or that too much
time has passed is the very argument Nazi war criminals or
governments sympathetic to the Nazis have used since the end of
World War II.
Israel did not accept these arguments from
Argentina or "Ivan the Terrible." 260 The fact that the victims in
this case are not Jews does not make the crimes less horrific. To
follow down this path of logic Is to follow the logic justifying the
failure to punish those who committed the horrors suffered in the
concentration camps in the former Yugoslavia or Nazi Germany,
which General Biro himself experienced firsthand.
Another option is for Egypt to abduct General Biro, just as
Israel did Eichmann in 1960, after Argentina refused its
extradition request. In a twist of fate, Egypt could cite Israeli
practice and case law to support its actions.2 6 1 This Is an
unlikely option, however, because it might lead to counter
abductions.
The long-term political risks far outweigh any

possible gain, especially when one considers the ongoing peace
process between Israel and its neighbors.

260. See generally Lippmann, supra note 174.
261. Another source of authority to support jurisdiction after an abduction
is the U.S. court-created Ker-Frlsble rule. This rule allows a court to exercise
jurisdiction over any fugitive offender who has been brought before a court by
whatever means, even illegal ones. The rule provides no basis for the fugitive to
challenge his return to the prosecuting jurisdiction. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 442-44 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1952); United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-62 (1992). This authority Is not a legal
basis for the abduction itself, but holds that the act of abduction does not create
a bar to prosecution.
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IX. CONCLUSION
No greater disgrace can befall the army and through it our
whole people, than the perpetration of barbarous outrages upon
the innocent and defenseless. Such proceedings not only disgrace
the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of
the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the
ends of our movement.
2 62
General Robert E. Lee

A logical solution to this politically charged situation is to
refer the matter to the United Nations and request that the United
Nations establish an independent prosecutor to review and
investigate the allegations. As a result, Israel would meet its
international law obligations while successfully precluding
(practically speaking) Egypt from acquiring personal jurisdiction
It appears that Egypt is moving in this
over General Biro.
direction.
If a recommendation to indict arises, the Israeli
government will not be prosecuting one of its own generals, and
the tribunal will occur outside the control of the Egyptian
government. While this solution may not seem acceptable to
General Biro, his own actions cannot be ignored. General Biro is
a survivor of the Holocaust and surely was aware of the post-war
trials of the late 1940s. He had direct and personal knowledge of
The primary
the helplessness protected persons experience.

reason for the international law of armed conflict is the protection
of the innocent from the horrors of war. If anyone should have
known that killing forty-nine helpless POWs was wrong, it would
be a survivor of similar atrocities.
The issue of who, when, and how atrocities are committed
should be irrelevant to any decision as to possible prosecution.
Political considerations should not be part of any legal analysis
when confronting grave breaches.
To reason otherwise is to
jeopardize the integrity and value of the Geneva Conventions and
international legal principles themselves. Only a full and open
inquiry into the facts can mitigate the tension between these
differing cultures and nations. Indifference, after all, is what
allowed the Nazis to commit atrocities with impunity. 26 3

262.

Only

EDWARD J. STACKPOLE, THEY MET AT GETTYSBURG 31 (1980).

263. Do not misunderstand. I in no way equate Israel in this case with the
conduct of Nazi Germany. On the contrary, its proud tradition of punishing war
criminals deserves accolades. But the appearance of punishing only war crimes
against Jews, absent action in this case, is obvious. The appearance of a double
standard is highlighted by former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's recent
statement that he would, if his party should come to power, try PLO Chairman
Yasser Arafat for war crimes. See Howard Goller, Israel's Sharon Would Try Arafat
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time will tell if Israel and the international community will
condone, by silence, a different standard for retired General Biro.
Yet, one thing is clear-no one accused of grave breaches should
be allowed to go to his grave without atoning for his deeds.

for War Crimes, Reuters. Oct. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.

